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EATERS, POWERLESS BY DESIGN
Margot J. Pollans*
Food law, including traditional food safety regulation, antihunger programs,
and food system worker protections, has received increased attention in recent
years as a distinct field of study. Bringing together these disparate areas of law
under a single lens provides an opportunity to understand the role of law in
shaping what we eat (what food is produced and where it is distributed), how
much we eat, and how we think about food. The food system is rife with problems—endemic hunger, worker exploitation, massive environmental externalities, and diet-related disease. Looked at in a piecemeal fashion, elements of
food law appear responsive to these problems. Looked at as a whole, however,
food law appears instead to entrench the existing structures of power that generate these problems.
This Article offers a novel conceptual critique of the food system. It argues that
food law is built on two contradictory myths: the myth of the helpless consumer
who needs government protections from food producers and the myth of the
responsible consumer who needs no government protection and can take on
the food system’s many problems herself. The first myth is self-actualizing, as
the laws that it justifies disempower food consumers and producers. The second myth is self-defeating, as the legal structures that assume consumer responsibility impede meaningful consumer choice.
Food law, as it is shaped by these myths, constructs powerlessness by homogenizing—or erasing diversity within—the food system, paralyzing consumers
through information control, and polarizing various food system constituents
who might otherwise collaborate on reform. Ultimately, food law is designed
to thwart food sovereignty. By revealing how the structures of food law itself
obstruct reform, this Article also identifies a path forward toward true food
sovereignty.

* Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University. Thanks to Hope
Babcock, Peter Barton Hutt, Noa Ben-Asher, Amy Cohen, Bridget Crawford, Barry Friedman,
Josh Galperin, Marc-Tizoc González, Lisa Heinzerling, Smita Narula, Jason Parkin, Lily Baum
Pollans, Nate Rosenberg, and Richard Stewart for their comments. This Article also benefited
from feedback from participants at the first Academy of Food Law and Policy conference, audience questions at the Georgetown University Law Center Environmental Speakers Series, the
excellent research assistance of Chris Arrigoni, Tala DiBenedetto, Clara Geffroy, Colin Myers,
Aaron Rudyan, and Alicia Stoklosa, and the fantastic work of the Michigan Law Review staff.
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INTRODUCTION
Food system scholars have for decades critiqued food production, distribution, and consumption, pointing in particular to the ways the system reinforces economic inequality, protects the power of the food industry (often
referred to as “big food”), and enables exploitation. 1 Critics point to rising
rates of diet-related disease (particularly in the Global North), 2 perpetual cycles of poverty and hunger (particularly in the Global South), 3 environmental
externalities of food production, 4 abuse and economic injustice along the food
supply chain, 5 and, increasingly, infringement of animal welfare. 6 These concerns have spawned a wealth of social movements and academic literature
identifying and targeting a broad range of culprits: global entities such as the

1. Alison Hope Alkon & Teresa Marie Mares, Food Sovereignty in US Food Movements:
Radical Visions and Neoliberal Constraints, 29 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 347 (2012); Alison Hope
Alkon & Julie Guthman, Introduction, in THE NEW FOOD ACTIVISM: OPPOSITION, COOPERATION,
AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 1, 10–15 (Alison Hope Alkon & Julie Guthman eds., 2017); Sarah A.
Roache, Charles Platkin, Lawrence O. Gostin & Cara Kaplan, Big Food and Soda Versus Public
Health: Industry Litigation Against Local Government Regulations to Promote Healthy Diets, 45
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1051 (2018). Marxist critiques of the food system and the refrain that the
food system is broken are also common. See, e.g., Thomas Cheney, Historical Materialism and
Alternative Food: Alienation, Division of Labour, and the Production of Consumption, 11 SOCIALIST
STUD. 105 (2016); Otto Scharmer, Opinion, An Apple Shows Just How Broken Our Food System
Is, HUFFPOST (Mar. 11, 2019), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/opinion-scharmer-ourbroken-food-system_us_5b06b0a0e4b05f0fc8455acb [perma.cc/E2VB-ND6Y]; Tamar Haspel,
10 Things We Should Do to Fix Our Broken Food System, WASH. POST (Dec. 28, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/10-things-we-should-do-to-fix-our-broken-food-system/2015/12/28/ea720336-a8f7-11e5-9b92-dea7cd4b1a4d_story.html [perma.cc/32HJ-X44J];
Guido Schmidt-Traub & Michael Obersteiner, Fixing Our Broken Food System: A Crucial SDG
Challenge, HORIZONS, Summer 2018, at 160. More recently, advocates have begun to argue, and
this author agrees, that “broken” is the wrong word because, as this Article demonstrates, the
system is functioning exactly as was designed. See, e.g., Sarah Mock, The Problem with the Food
System Is It Works: And How to Break It, MEDIUM (Nov. 18, 2018), https://sarah-k-mock.medium.com/the-problem-with-the-food-system-is-it-works-39604d56a84f [perma.cc/M7F4-KDTL].
2. E.g., Emily Broad Leib, The Forgotten Half of Food System Reform: Using Food and
Agricultural Law to Foster Healthy Food Production, 9 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 17, 20–25 (2013).
3. E.g., Jennifer Williams Zwagerman, Recognizing Challenges and Opportunities in the
Quest to End Hunger, 4 TEX. A&M L. REV. 315, 317–18 (2017); Laura Niada, Hunger and International Law: The Far-Reaching Scope of the Human Right to Food, 22 CONN. J. INT’L L. 131,
137–42 (2006).
4. E.g., J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274–92 (2000).
5. E.g., Stephen Lee, The Food We Eat and the People Who Feed Us, 94 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249 (2017); Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Extending the Fantasy in the Supermarket: Where Unhealthy
Food Promotions Meet Children and How the Government Can Intervene, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV.
117 (2012).
6. E.g., Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J. ANIMAL L. &
ETHICS 63 (2006); Darian M. Ibrahim, The Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J.
ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175 (2006); Stephen A. Plass, Exploring Animal Rights as an Imperative for
Human Welfare, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 403 (2010).

646

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:643

World Trade Organization; 7 the meat processing industry; 8 multinational
food companies; 9 grocery, retail, and fast-food chains; 10 genetic engineering;
Monsanto (now Bayer); 11 and many others.
This Article takes on a different type of culprit: food law itself. U.S. food
law constructs powerlessness. Many food laws treat consumers as victims, but
others reflect narratives of blame, holding consumers responsible for their
own ills (including hunger and obesity). Because of this legal structure, food
can serve neither our nutritional nor our cultural needs.
This Article identifies three mechanisms through which food law disempowers: homogenization, information control, and polarization. Together
these three phenomena strip individuals and communities of sovereignty,
both directly through authoritarian-style governance and indirectly through
imposition of dominant cultural practices. Drawing on a broad literature on
food sovereignty, this Article describes U.S. food law as a system of control
rather than a system of nourishment. 12

7. See Hilal Elver, The Challenges and Developments of the Right to Food in the 21st Century: Reflections of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 20 UCLA J. INT’L
L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 1, 19–20 (2016).
8. See Kelsea Kenzy Sutton, Note, The Beef with Big Meat: Meatpacking and Antitrust in
America’s Heartland, 58 S.D. L. REV. 611, 629 (2013).
9. Roache et al., supra note 1, at 1061–67; Michele Simon, Commentary, PepsiCo and
Public Health: Is the Nation’s Largest Food Company a Model of Corporate Responsibility or Master of Public Relations?, 15 CUNY L. REV. 9 (2011).
10. See Diana L. Moss & C. Robert Taylor, Short Ends of the Stick: The Plight of Growers
and Consumers in Concentrated Agricultural Supply Chains, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 337, 353–56.
11. Rebecca M. Bratspies, Hunger and Equity in an Era of Genetic Engineering, 7 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 195 (2017); Saby Ghoshray, Food Safety and Security in the Monsanto Era: Peering
Through the Lens of a Rights Paradigm Against an Onslaught of Corporate Domination, 65 ME.
L. REV. 491 (2013).
12. La Via Campesina, an international peasant movement, first defined food sovereignty
in 1996 and has described it as “the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food
produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their
own food and agriculture systems.” Declaration of Nyéléni, LA VIA CAMPESINA (Feb. 27, 2007),
https://viacampesina.org/en/declaration-of-nyi [perma.cc/FRK8-HGHJ]; see also Raj Patel,
What Does Food Sovereignty Look Like?, 36 J. PEASANT STUD. 663, 665 (2009); Madeleine Fairbairn, Framing Transformation: The Counter-Hegemonic Potential of Food Sovereignty in the US
Context, 29 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 217, 222–23 (2012); Aeyal Gross & Tamar Feldman, “We
Didn’t Want to Hear the Word ‘Calories’ ”: Rethinking Food Security, Food Power, and Food Sovereignty—Lessons from the Gaza Closure, 33 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 379 (2015) (arguing that food
sovereignty is an essential companion concept to food security for understanding power dynamics in the context of Israeli control of Gaza). But see Devon G. Peña, Autonomía and Food Sovereignty: Decolonization Across the Food Chain, in MEXICAN-ORIGIN FOODS, FOODWAYS, AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: DECOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES 5, 10–13 (Devon G. Peña, Luz Calvo, Pancho
McFarland & Gabriel R. Valle eds., 2017) (critiquing La Via Campesina’s approach to food sovereignty for promoting western concepts of human rights and accepting sovereign state power
and anthropocentric dominionism).
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First, homogenizing, or flattening difference within, a pluralistic society
is a mechanism for social control. 13 Homogenization in the food system targets impurities in food itself and deviations in how food is produced and
talked about. It has collateral consequences for diversity of food and participation in food production. As a result, it limits individual and community autonomy in food choice and sterilizes diversified food traditions. Hygiene is
one prominent mechanism of, and excuse for, food system homogenization.
With the stated goal of food safety, food hygiene rules seek to eliminate impurities. In practice, these rules tend to extend beyond combating illness and
embrace the romantic purity of a mythic past, often a past characterized by
racial uniformity. 14 Other food laws seeking to protect consumers from fraudulent or confusing food marketing also contribute to this phenomenon.
Second, information control limits food system participants’ autonomy
and agency. Drawing a parallel to authoritarian regimes, which consolidate
and hold power by suppressing critique and constraining dissemination of information that might feed dissent, is illuminating. Such regimes also celebrate
misinformation, using propaganda to spread false and misleading narratives
about dissidents and disfavored political viewpoints. 15 Our food law system is
not, strictly speaking, authoritarian, but these practices are nevertheless prevalent. U.S. food law suppresses information about, and criticism of, the food
system, and it allows for strategic use of information chaos to foster confusion
and stymie reform.
Finally, polarization preserves status quo allocations of power by preventing the development of new coalitions that might challenge that power. Polarization occurs along multiple lines in the food system. Isolating food
consumers from food system workers is common. In a system characterized
by lengthy supply chains, food consumption and food production are remote
from one another. Even when consumers and producers have shared interests,
there are significant barriers to communication and mutual identification. In
addition, isolation occurs among food consumers who participate in different
types of food markets. Specifically, the food system has fractured into two primary markets—a conventional market emphasizing abundance that does not
account for the externalities of food production and an elite, high-cost market
that promises consumers higher quality, better health, and reduced environmental footprints. 16 As social and political identities form around both markets, consumers become increasingly polarized.
13. Cf. JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM 151
(2018) (describing “diversity, with its concomitant tolerance of difference,” as “a threat to fascist
ideology,” which “rejects pluralism and tolerance”).
14. See id. at 4 (identifying as a common feature of fascism the reliance on myth “based
on fantasies of a nonexistent past uniformity”); TIAGO SARAIVA, FASCIST PIGS:
TECHNOSCIENTIFIC ORGANISMS AND THE HISTORY OF FASCISM 6 (2016).
15. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 341 (new ed. 1973) (describing the role of information control in authoritarian regimes).
16. Of course, there is significant overlap between these markets, with the elite market
driving trends in the conventional market. The growing popularity of organics is one example.
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Underlying and justifying many of the legal rules that generate these features are two contradictory myths about food consumers. The first myth is
that consumers are helpless: the law must treat them as objects for protection.
This myth justifies a series of consumer protection laws focusing on food
safety and food fraud. These are the laws that generate homogenization. This
myth is self-actualizing, as the laws that it justifies disempower food consumers
and producers by limiting what foods are considered safe, clean, and healthy.
The second myth is that of the responsible consumer: consumers are encouraged to take personal responsibility both for their own health and for the
health of the system as a whole. This myth sets the stage for information-control policies that leave consumers helpless. It does so by limiting availability of
meaningful information and relieving governmental responsibility either to
address food system problems or to hold food producers accountable for the
harmful externalities of their products. This second myth is self-defeating, as
the legal structures that assume consumer responsibility impede meaningful
consumer choice. This tug-of-war reinforces the wealth and power of narrow
segments of the food system while disempowering and devaluing food system
workers and food consumers.
Part I explores homogenization in the U.S. food system. It introduces the
myth of the helpless consumer and shows how it manifests in two areas of
food law: food safety and food fraud. Part I then argues that these laws create
homogenization by contributing to consolidation along the food supply chain
and standardization of what food is produced and how. Part I concludes by
arguing that homogenization is a tool for eater and producer disempowerment because it narrows the realm of what counts as good food.
Part II considers information control in the U.S. food system. It introduces the myth of the responsible consumer and identifies three key areas of
consumer responsibility: personal health, household food security, and equity
and sustainability across the food supply chain. Part II then argues that a series
of information-control laws construct helplessness for the responsible consumer by making it difficult for consumers to access and process meaningful
information. Within the morass of food system transparency, it is impossible
for consumers to fulfill their alleged responsibilities.
Part III considers how both these myths, and their attendant food laws
and policies, contribute to polarization within the food system, isolating consumers from food systems workers and from one another. This isolation protects existing structures of power in the food system and leaves both workers
and consumers open to exploitation. Part III then briefly revisits how homogenization, information controls, and polarization contribute to powerlessness
for many food system participants. It concludes with some preliminary ideas
on how to begin claiming sovereignty.

Organic Market Summary and Trends, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www
.ers.usda.gov/topics/natural-resources-environment/organic-agriculture/organic-market-summary-and-trends [perma.cc/UL8T-PW6F].
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FROM HELPLESSNESS TO HOMOGENIZATION

The myth of the helpless consumer assumes that consumers do not have
the capacity to protect themselves, and it imposes a one-way chain of obligation from producers to consumers. The myth underlies several core areas of
food law, imposing on food producers, processors, distributors, and retailers
duties to adhere to a variety of standards of quality, safety, and truth in labeling. At its extreme, the myth of the helpless consumer generates black markets
in particular foods deemed too unsafe to be sold (for instance, raw milk) and
rallying cries for food freedom. 17
Policymakers use concern about consumers’ lack of capacity to protect
themselves and consumer confusion about product labeling to justify a wide
range of laws. These laws include food safety laws, which dictate production
practices, and food fraud laws, which dictate the language used on packaging.
These laws contribute to homogenization by accelerating corporate consolidation at all stages in the food supply chain and by sterilizing and standardizing food and food production practices. Homogenization thus occurs at a
variety of levels, affecting food itself, food production processes, and food system participation. As homogenization narrows the realm of what counts as
good food, it disempowers consumers and producers who might want to eat
outside of that realm.
A. The Helpless Consumer as Food Law’s Beneficiary
Food safety laws and fraud laws protect consumers from potential badproducer behavior (negligent or otherwise) and from risks associated with food
consumption. Both sets of laws assume that producers are better positioned
to protect consumers from these risks because producers have more information about, and control over, food ingredients and production processes.

17. See Baylen J. Linnekin, The “California Effect” & the Future of American Food: How
California’s Growing Crackdown on Food & Agriculture Harms the State & the Nation, 13 CHAP.
L. REV. 357, 358, 364 (2010) (using the phrase “food fascism” to refer to laws such as California’s
foie gras ban and its restrictions on the cage sizes of laying hens). But see Samuel R. Wiseman,
The Dangerous Right to Food Choice, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1299 (2015) (arguing that those with
the most to gain from complete freedom of food choice are not consumers but the food industry). Indeed, these types of food laws are widely critiqued on libertarian grounds. See BAYLEN J.
LINNEKIN, BITING THE HANDS THAT FEED US: HOW FEWER, SMARTER LAWS WOULD MAKE OUR
FOOD SYSTEM MORE SUSTAINABLE (2016) (arguing that overregulation of food production discourages sustainability by driving up production costs and discouraging innovation); JOEL
SALATIN, EVERYTHING I WANT TO DO IS ILLEGAL: WAR STORIES FROM THE LOCAL FOOD FRONT
(2007) (arguing that food safety law puts particular burdens on smaller-scale sustainable-food
businesses). This “food freedom” movement emphasizes the consequences of food safety law for
individual consumer choice. For instance, many outspoken defenders of raw milk challenge state
and federal prohibitions, arguing both that raw milk is safe and that individuals should be able
to assume the risk of purchasing it. See id. at 17. This Article is concerned less with individual
free choice and more with the systemic constraints that undermine the extent to which the
choices we do make can possibly be meaningful.
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Protection from Unsafe Food

Food safety is at the core of food law. The primary purpose of food safety
law is to protect consumers from acute, ingestion-related harms such as foodborne illness. 18 Indeed, foodborne illness poses a serious threat to food consumers, killing around three thousand people every year in the United States
alone. 19 A complex network of federal and state laws govern safety by prohibiting certain types of contaminants, setting tolerance limits on others, and regulating the sanitary conditions in which food is produced, processed,
distributed, and served. 20 Food safety law is consumer oriented, seeking to
protect the helpless consumer from unscrupulous producers who might seek
to cut costs by using tainted ingredients, producing food in unsanitary conditions, or skipping disinfection steps. Food safety law creates powerful pressure
on food producers to prioritize safety over other interests, including workplace safety and environmental protection. 21 Food safety laws reflect a legal
obsession with purity, which, as the next Section discusses, drives food system
homogenization.
Food safety law influences food product development, shaping production methods and conditions as well as ingredient choice. 22 Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) rules implementing the Food Safety Modernization
Act of 2011 (FSMA) include specific directives governing a significant swath
of the food supply chain, including irrigation of produce fields, produce washing and packing, and food processing and distribution. 23 Federal law also
closely regulates animal slaughter and meat processing. 24 States regulate retail
18. See Emily M. Broad Leib & Margot J. Pollans, The New Food Safety, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
1173 passim (2019).
19. RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22600, THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM:
A PRIMER 1 (2016) (noting that annually in the United States there are about 48 million illnesses,
128,000 hospitalizations, and 3,000 deaths from foodborne illness). It is also worth noting that
although food safety is extremely important, it is a small-scale problem compared with the other
public-health concerns of the food system (such as worker exploitation, diet-related disease, and
environmental contamination). See Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18.
20. E.g., Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act § 402, 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (defining adulteration by reference to, among other things, “poisonous or deleterious” ingredients and “insanitary conditions” for preparing, packing, or holding); Food Safety Modernization Act § 105, 21
U.S.C. § 350h (directing the FDA to establish produce safety requirements).
21. Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18, at 1202 (discussing the problematic consequences of overprotective food safety laws).
22. Telephone Interview with Aaron Singer, Gen. Couns., Boxed (Apr. 30, 2021) (explaining that bulk-food delivery service Boxed has internal food safety standards that are more stringent than regulatory requirements and that, from the perspective of the legal team, food safety
considerations are more pressing than environmental or consumer health considerations for
which there are not specific production requirements); Camila Gadotti, Examining the Role of
Food Safety During R&D, FOOD SAFETY TECH (Sept. 4, 2015), https://foodsafetytech.com/column/examining-the-role-of-food-safety-during-rd [perma.cc/95SL-9MS3].
23. E.g., Produce Safety Rule, 21 C.F.R. pt. 112 (2020); Human Preventive Controls Rule,
21 C.F.R. pt. 117 (2020).
24. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–695.
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food service, and all fifty states have adopted some version of the FDA’s model
food code, which applies the same level of precision to regulation of restaurants and other parts of the food service industry. 25 Tort law reinforces food
safety law, imposing strict liability for harm that follows from food consumption. 26 In addition to substantive obligations, food companies also face recordkeeping requirements. 27 For instance, in dairy processing, cheese manufacturers must keep detailed records of pasteurization practices. 28 These laws impose significant regulatory burdens on farms, food processors, and food
service establishments.
2.

Protection from Fraud and Confusion

Like food safety laws, food fraud law seeks to protect consumers from
food producers who might take advantage of information asymmetries. These
laws emphasize the importance of truth in labeling and penalize producers
and marketers for misbranding. Food fraud law relies on control of language.
Although this mechanism ostensibly protects the helpless consumer from
confusion, it also shapes participation in food markets. 29 This Section provides a brief overview of food fraud laws and then delves into two examples:
standards of identity and organic labeling. Both are illustrative of how the
quest to protect consumers from confusion ultimately disempowers those
same consumers by controlling the language we use to describe food.
Food fraud laws serve to protect consumers from false and misleading
claims on food packaging and advertising. A slew of information disclosure
laws are designed to prevent fraud. 30 These include requirements to display
25. NAT’L RETAIL FOOD TEAM, U.S. FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., ADOPTION OF THE FDA
FOOD CODE BY STATE AND TERRITORIAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF
RESTAURANTS AND RETAIL FOOD STORES 5–6 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/107543/download [perma.cc/5GPC-HKJJ]; see FOOD CODE (U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
2017), https://www.fda.gov/media/110822/download [perma.cc/T7SZ-SCY5].
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1965) (“The rule
stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human consumption, or other products
for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously include them.”). But see Melissa Mortazavi,
Tort as Democracy: Lessons from the Food Wars, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 929, 938–39 (2015) (arguing
that while food-related tort litigation “has traditionally focused on food safety,” it has broadened
in recent years to address a range of issues, including “the cultural, moral, and political meanings
of food as a dignitary issue”).
27. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 112.161–.167 (detailing FSMA record-keeping requirements for
produce safety).
28. GRADE “A” PASTEURIZED MILK ORDINANCE item 16p.(D), at 108 (U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. 2015), https://www.fda.gov/media/99451/download [perma.cc/5MES-67FZ].
29. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of language control comes from George Orwell’s
1984. In that story, the government of Oceania used Newspeak, a state-created and enforced
language, as a mind control tool. If the vocabulary to object doesn’t exist, you cannot object. No
totalitarian state has ever reached this level of control, but the extreme establishes for us the
premise: control of language can shape lived experiences.
30. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(a)(1) (2020). Information disclosure is discussed in more
detail in Part II.
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food identity and a net quantity statement. 31 Packages must display a nutrition
facts panel. 32 Similar nutrition facts disclosure requirements apply to chain
restaurants. 33 In addition, all other information on the display must comply
with a comprehensive set of rules regarding misbranding and health claims. 34
Many of these laws target “economic adulteration,” a practice in which a food
manufacturer uses a cheaper substitute for a listed ingredient. 35 Economic
adulteration is common in fish, honey, wine, and olive oil. 36
Reinforcing these federal statutory obligations are state statutory and
common law fraud protections. Consumer fraud law reinforces misbranding
laws, creating liability for material misrepresentation. 37 Recently, a spate of
lawsuits under state consumer protection laws have targeted label claims such
as “natural.” 38 Fraud laws open up producers to a range of possible litigation
(from consumers, the FDA, and the Federal Trade Commission). Although
these laws leave some room for “puffery” and assume that consumers are reasonable, they create significant constraints for producers. 39
a.

Standards of Identity

A variety of current and recently proposed federal and state laws seek to
define specific terms used in food labeling and marketing. The examples of
“milk,” “meat,” and “organic” illuminate this phenomenon. In recent years,
the markets for vegan alternative foods have expanded significantly amid concerns about animal welfare and the carbon footprint of animal agriculture. 40
The Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) authorizes the FDA to develop

31. Id. §§ 101.3, 101.107(h); see also 9 C.F.R. § 317.2(i) (2020) (requiring an inspection
legend and establishment number for meat products); id. § 381.125(a) (requiring safe handling
information for poultry).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 343(q).
33. Id. § 343(q)(5)(H).
34. Id. § 343 (defining misbranding).
35. RENÉE JOHNSON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43358, FOOD FRAUD AND “ECONOMICALLY
MOTIVATED ADULTERATION” OF FOOD AND FOOD INGREDIENTS (2014).
36. Id. at 1.
37. See, e.g., Smajlaj v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D.N.J. 2011) (evaluating a
consumer allegation that “less sodium” on a Campbell’s Soup can was misleading). The Federal
Trade Commission, which regulates marketing pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. § 45, also regulates food marketing. See Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 app. at
182–83 (1984) (describing how the FTC defines material misrepresentation).
38. Neal Hooker, Christopher T. Simons & Efthimios Parasidis, “Natural” Food Claims:
Industry Practices, Consumer Expectations, and Class Action Lawsuits, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 319
(2018).
39. See generally Paul Chan, Liable Labels, L.A. LAW., Feb. 2015, at 25 (describing the rise
of consumer food litigation).
40. Amy Brown, Growing Fears for Climate Help Fuel Rise in Plant-Based Diets, REUTERS
EVENTS (May 28, 2019) https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/growing-fears-climatehelp-fuel-rise-plant-based-diets [perma.cc/QFE4-F9XH].
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standards of identity for foods. 41 These standards specify with great particularity what constitutes a particular type of food, and they are intended to prevent consumer confusion. 42 The agency has set standards for many foods,
including peanut butter, maple syrup, sherbet, and milk. 43 For many years, the
FDA relied heavily on food standards of identity, often using very precise
standards for common food terms. 44 Although such standards have mostly
fallen out of favor, recently the dairy industry and some members of Congress
have been pushing the agency to crack down on rampant use of the term
“milk” on nondairy products. 45 The FDA first defined milk in 1977 as “the
lacteal secretion . . . of one or more healthy cows.” 46 This definition, which the
FDA has not strictly enforced, excludes nondairy milks and even milk from
other mammals, such as goats or sheep. 47 In a 2016 letter to the FDA, members of Congress called current misuse “harmful to the dairy industry.” 48 The

41. See 21 U.S.C. § 341. On the history and operation of these standards, see Richard A.
Merrill & Earl M. Collier, Jr., “Like Mother Used to Make”: An Analysis of FDA Food Standards
of Identity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 562–81 (1974).
42. See Food Standards; General Principles and Food Standards Modernization, 70 Fed.
Reg. 29,214, 29,216 (proposed May 20, 2005) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 130) (describing the
function of and legal authority for standards of identity).
43. 21 C.F.R. § 164.150 (2020) (peanut butter); id. § 168.140 (maple syrup); id. § 135.140
(sherbet); id. § 131.110 (milk). For a complete list of foods with standards of identity, see id.
§§ 130–169 (codifying standards).
44. See, e.g., id. § 135.140 (establishing the standard for sherbet).
45. See, e.g., NAT’L MILK PRODUCERS FED’N, CITIZEN PETITION ON BEHALF OF THE
NATIONAL MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION 4 (2019), https://www.nmpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/National-Milk-Producers-Federation-Citizen-Petition-and-Attachments.pdf
[perma.cc/F7H2-H6VQ] (petitioning the FDA to enforce existing “imitation” labeling requirements “against nutritionally inferior non-dairy substitutes for standardized dairy foods” and “to
codify in more detailed form longstanding FDA policies that permit the name of a standardized
dairy food . . . to be used in the statement of identity of a non-dairy substitute for the standardized food only under limited and defined conditions”).
46. 21 C.F.R. § 131.110(a) (2020).
47. The FDA sent occasional warning letters to companies selling nondairy products. See,
e.g., Letter from Alonza E. Cruse, L.A. Dist. Off., U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Long H. Lai, Lifesoy,
Inc. (Aug. 8, 2008), https://www.fdalabelcompliance.com/letters/ucm1048184 [perma.cc/8VQXRZY2]. There have also been occasional consumer suits. See, e.g., Priscilla DeGregory, Woman
Sues Vegan ‘Butter’ for Not Being Real Butter, N.Y. POST (Nov. 12, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://nypost
.com/2018/11/12/woman-sues-vegan-butter-for-not-being-real-butter [perma.cc/TMF9-2WTQ].
48. Letter from 32 Members of Congress to Robert M. Califf, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin. (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nmpf.org/wp-content/uploads//Welch-Simpson%20Letter.pdf [perma.cc/LX7B-MWZJ]. For a discussion of the effect of nondairy milks on the dairy
industry, see Beth Kaiserman, Dairy Industry Struggles in a Sea of Plant-Based Milks, FORBES
(Jan. 31, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bethkaiserman/2019/01/31/dairy-industry-plant-based-milks [perma.cc/9X79-ADGJ]. In April 2021, Senator Tammy Baldwin of
Wisconsin introduced the “Defending Against Imitations and Replacements of Yogurt, Milk,
and Cheese to Promote Regular Intake of Dairy Everyday Act” or “DAIRY PRIDE Act,” which
seeks to compel the FDA to enforce the standard of identity against plant-based alternatives to
milk, cheese, yogurt, etc. S. 1346, 117th Cong. (2021).
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campaign is an explicit attempt to use language control to curb the growing
popularity of plant-based products.
In 2018, the FDA announced plans to review the issue in order to “ensure
that the labeling of such products does not mislead consumers, especially if
this could compromise their health and well-being.” 49 The agency solicited
comments and feedback from the public to gain more insight into how consumers use plant-based alternatives and how they understand terms like “milk” or
“cheese” when used to label products made from soy, peas, or nuts. 50 The FDA
was concerned with whether consumers understood the nutritional characteristics and differences between those products and dairy in determining
their own dietary choices. 51 The agency claimed to be collecting information
as part of “efforts to reduce chronic disease and its impact on public health.” 52
A similar fight is playing out over the word “meat.” Nearly half of the
states have introduced meat-label censorship laws that aim to stop meat alternatives, including both plant-based and lab-grown products, from being marketed as “meat.” 53 Ten states have passed such laws. Missouri, which was the
first in August 2018, requires that products not derived from poultry or livestock include phrases such as “lab-grown” or “plant-based” on their packaging. 54 Any producer failing to include an appropriate disclaimer after January
1, 2019, would be subject to fines and a possible jail sentence. 55 The law is the
subject of ongoing litigation on First Amendment and Dormant Commerce
Clause grounds. 56 Wyoming’s version of the law is stricter, prohibiting using
49. Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Statement on Modernizing Standards of Identity and the Use of Dairy Names for Plant-Based Substitutes (Sept. 27,
2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissionerscott-gottlieb-md-modernizing-standards-identity-and-use-dairy-names [perma.cc/HE5W486P]. The effort is one of multiple in a multiyear Nutrient Innovation Strategy. Id.
50. Use of the Names of Dairy Foods in the Labeling of Plant-Based Products, 83 Fed.
Reg. 49,103, 49,103 (Sept. 28, 2018).
51. Id.
52. Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, supra note 49. The Senate rejected a proposal to block
FDA spending on this inquiry. Katherine Tully-McManus, Senators Ask ‘What Is Milk?’: Dairy
Industry Wants to Limit the Word to What Comes out of Cows, ROLL CALL (Aug. 1, 2018, 11:19
AM), https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/got-milk-senators-ask-milk [perma.cc/8JC8XBHZ]. Senator Mike Lee sponsored the bill, expressing his view that consumers are fully informed on the differences between dairy and plant-based milks. See id.
53. Elaine Watson, Plant-Based and Cell-Cultured ‘Meat’ Labeling Under Attack in 25
States, FOODNAVIGATOR (July 29, 2019, 8:34 AM), https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2019/05/29/Plant-based-and-cell-cultured-meat-labeling-under-attack-in-25-states
[perma.cc/Q4BG-9BBU]; see also Federal Court Blocks ‘Veggie Burger’ Censorship Law, ACLU
(Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/federal-court-blocks-veggie-burger-censorship-law [perma.cc/22PP-N35Q].
54. Public Statement—Meat Labeling, MO. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://agriculture.mo.gov/animals/meat.php [perma.cc/7FTB-F9YT].
55. See id.
56. Complaint at 2, Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Richardson, 425 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (W.D.
Mo. 2019) (No. 18-cv-04173). Settlement talks between the parties, including the Good Food
Institute, the Animal Legal Defense Fund, the ACLU of Missouri, and Tofurky broke down in
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the word “meat” on labeling for any product not derived from poultry or livestock. 57 Other states with similar laws include Arkansas, 58 Kentucky, 59 North
Dakota, 60 South Dakota, 61 Montana, 62 Louisiana, 63 South Carolina, 64 Mississippi, 65 Georgia, 66 and Alabama. 67 A number of other states have tried and
failed to pass such laws. 68
b.

Organic Labeling

The development of organics law predates these “milk” and “meat” debates and reflects a slightly different pattern of linguistic control. With “milk”
and “meat,” traditional and powerful industries are struggling to retain control of key words to prevent market encroachment from vegan alternatives. By
contrast, the regulation of “organic” was originally intended to protect an alternative market. Over the course of the definition’s development, however,
control over the word has shifted.
The Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA) authorizes the Department of Agriculture (USDA) to regulate use of the term “organic” and is
designed to preempt various state and private organic-certification schemes. 69
The Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) determines which food production and processing practices qualify as “organic” and how the word may be
2019. Michelle C. Pardo, No Meating of the Minds: Settlement Reaches an Impasse in Missouri
Meat Advertising Lawsuit, DUANE MORRIS: ANIMAL L. DEVS. (July 9, 2019), https://blogs
.duanemorris.com/animallawdevelopments/2019/07/09/no-meating-of-the-minds-settlementreaches-an-impasse-in-missouri-meat-advertising-lawsuit [perma.cc/H3AK-XT5H].
57. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-7-119 (2021).
58. ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-1-302 (Supp. 2021).
59. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.035 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020).
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-02.1-12.1 (Supp. 2021).
61. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 39-4-26 (Supp. 2021).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-31-103(19) (2019).
63. LA. STAT. ANN. § 3:4743 (Supp. 2021).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-17-510 (Supp. 2020).
65. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-35-15 (Supp. 2020). In 2019, the Mississippi Department of
Agriculture promulgated a rule clarifying that a plant-based product including a front of package
qualifier such as “plant-based” or “meat-free” would not violate the law. 2-7 MISS. CODE R.
§ 112.01 (LexisNexis 2019). The Institute for Justice, which had brought suit challenging the law,
suggested that the changes were in response to their lawsuit. Press Release, Inst. for Just., Under
New Proposed Regulation, “Veggie” Burgers Will Be Legal in Mississippi (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://ij.org/press-release/under-new-proposed-regulation-veggie-burgers-will-be-legal-inmississippi [perma.cc/UZ5A-LMUZ].
66. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-152 (Supp. 2021).
67. ALA. CODE § 2-17-10 (LexisNexis Supp. 2020).
68. See, e.g., S. 304, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2019); H.R. 2556, 101st Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); L. 594, 106th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2019); H.R. 1414, 55th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2019); S. 2035, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); H.R. 1519, 66th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); H.R. 2604, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2019); H.B. 2274, 2019 Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2019); H.R. 222, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2019).
69. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6503(a), 6505(a)(1); 7 C.F.R. § 2.79(a)(8)(liii) (2021).
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used in food labels and advertising. 70 Although the statute has some underlying environmental goals, its primary purpose is to facilitate marketing of organic products by ensuring the label’s validity. 71
The “organic” movement began as a reaction to the industrialization of
agriculture. 72 Critical food scholar Julie Guthman has identified two key constituents of the movement: “those who see organic agriculture as simply a more
ecologically benign approach to farming and those who seek a radical alternative to a hegemonic food system.” 73 Guthman observes that the organic label
ultimately serves neither end particularly well, in part because of how the organic industry has itself industrialized and replicated the conventional agricultural industry. 74 Many have expressed concern that large-scale agribusiness has
flooded into the industry, following the letter but not the spirit of the law. 75
Meanwhile, smaller enterprises that continue to follow the spirit of the law are
not always able to comply with its letter. For instance, Roxbury Farm, a fourhundred-acre farm in Kinderhook, New York, that has operated a community–supported agriculture program since 1991, decided only recently to apply for organic certification. 76 As the farm explained to members in a weekly
newsletter, “[f]or years we followed all of the rules but didn’t certify as we have
such a direct connection to all of you. An expensive certification didn’t seem
necessary. Each year we pay between $3000 and $4000 to use the certified organic label.” 77
In each of these examples, language control is justified on the grounds of
protecting helpless consumers from confusion. In both cases, however, there is
70. See About AMS, USDA AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/about-ams
[perma.cc/JTX8-BCTU]; Organic Production/Organic Food: Information Access Tools, USDA
NAT’L AGRIC. LIBR. (Oct. 2021), https://www.nal.usda.gov/afsic/organic-productionorganicfood-information-access-tools [perma.cc/4D82-BWJ3].
71. Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 640 (2010) (describing the organics program as marketing
regulation).
72. JULIE GUTHMAN, AGRARIAN DREAMS: THE PARADOX OF ORGANIC FARMING IN
CALIFORNIA 12 (2014) (situating the origins of the “organic critique” of industrialized agriculture in the latter’s “social and ecological exploitation”).
73. Id. at 3.
74. Id. at 21–22 (observing that despite the critique, organic food is less toxic for farmworkers, neighbors, and eaters than the alternative); BRIAN K. OBACH, ORGANIC STRUGGLE: THE
MOVEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE IN THE UNITED STATES 159–60 (2015) (observing
that the passage of OFPA contributed to consumers and conventional agribusiness enterprises
flooding into the market); see also GUNTRA A. AISTARA, ORGANIC SOVEREIGNTIES: STRUGGLES
OVER FARMING IN AN AGE OF FREE TRADE 21–26 (2018) (exploring how free-trade regimes and
the pressure for regulatory harmonization have undermined “organic sovereignties” in other
countries).
75. E.g., OBACH, supra note 74.
76. Week #13, Newsletter (Roxbury Farm CSA, Kinderhook, N.Y.), Sept. 1, 2020 [hereinafter Roxbury Farm Newsletter], https://mailchi.mp/roxburyfarm.com/june-8-2020-newsfrom-the-farm-1732452 [perma.cc/N9QK-G8LV].
77. Id. (lamenting that “once Cheetos could be certified organic, the meaning of the label
was watered down a bit for us”).
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another primary constituency: competitors. Like other types of food fraud laws,
particularly those governing economic adulteration, these language controls
protect other industry participants by establishing legal monopolies over certain words. Language control in the guise of helping the helpless thus allows for
some degree of control over food itself. Its primary function is to steer consumer purchasing toward products complying with state-sanctioned definitions and to protect the economic interests of the producers of those products.
B. Homogenizing Food and Food Production
The law of the helpless consumer homogenizes the food system. The proliferation of food standards generates a set of forces, including consumer expectations, retailer and other wholesale-buyer standards, and individual
inspectors with discretion, that expand the standards’ reach. Consequently,
the entire system works to iron out inconsistencies—to reign in foreign practices. Uniformity across the food system, which is increasingly a global phenomenon, serves to sterilize diverse food cultures, suppress creative
expression that falls outside narrowly defined food norms, and homogenize
the experience of food consumption.
In a moment when foodie culture proliferates, the diversity of available
food types appears to be on the rise. This Section nevertheless hypothesizes
that although choice appears to be increasing from a consumer perspective
(particularly an elite consumer perspective), the increase masks a more fundamental narrowing that follows from the control that state regulators and
consolidated food processors and retailers have over the food system. Indeed,
while the total number of available food products continues to increase, the
selection becomes increasingly consistent from store to store as consolidation
continues in the retail and restaurant industries. 78 This appearance of choice
hides how the reorientation of the global food system to create this choice
generates great costs for many people in developing countries and for lowincome communities within the United States. 79 While surface-level choice
proliferates, meaningful choice disappears.
Consider, for instance, a virtual stroll through the frozen-pizza department at stopandshop.com. A quick search turns up 185 different types of frozen pizza, pizza bites, pizza bagels, pizza pockets, and pizza-flavored burritos,
burgers, and even macaroni and cheese. This pizza cornucopia creates an illusion of choice, but the meaningful range of difference in this universe of highly
processed frozen foods is actually quite limited. And the vast majority of the
offerings come from just a handful of companies. Two main mechanisms contribute to this homogenization. The first is consolidation of production, processing, distribution, and retail. The second are processes of sterilization and
78. See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
79. See Mohsen Al Attar Ahmed, Monocultures of the Law: Legal Sameness in the Restructuring of Global Agriculture, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 139, 147, 154–57 (2006) (exploring how agricultural intellectual property law contributes to declining crop diversity and the rise of
“homogenous industrial production systems” (emphasis omitted)).
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cultural hegemony. These processes reduce diversity of food choice and of
participation in food production. They also reduce diversity of participation
in food production governance by narrowing the realms of permissible expertise on which that governance relies. As the following discussion explains, the
law of the helpless consumer contributes to both consolidation and sterilization.
1.

Consolidating Food Production and Distribution

Consolidation is perhaps the single word that best sums up change in the
food system over the last century. 80 Part of this story is familiar. Throughout
the twentieth century, food production at all stages—from agricultural-input
production to farming, processing, and retail—has increased in scale and uniformity. 81 Indeed, despite occasional programs championing subsistence or
small-scale market farming, federal policy in the United States consistently
favors scale. 82 Federal policy facilitated cheap labor, first through state-sponsored slavery and then by excluding agricultural workers from labor laws. 83
Other early federal supports for scale include investment in irrigation projects
in the West. 84 In the twentieth century, state support for large-scale agriculture dates largely to the New Deal, during which time Congress developed a
series of agricultural supports that benefited larger-scale operations. 85 Of
course, federal policy is not the sole cause of consolidation in the food system.

80. See Moss & Taylor, supra note 10 (describing the extent of consolidation).
81. CAROLYN DIMITRI, ANNE EFFLAND & NEILSON CONKLIN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., THE
20TH CENTURY TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 2, 7 (2005),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/44197/13566_eib3_1_.pdf [perma.cc/5APTZLXD].
82. Noa Ben-Asher & Margot J. Pollans, The Right Family, 39 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.,
no. 1, 2019, at 1, 35; Nathan A. Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, The Butz Stops Here: Why the
Food Movement Needs to Rethink Agricultural History, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 12, 20–22 (2017)
(arguing that consolidation was not the inevitable result of technological development but instead the intentional result of federal policy).
83. Ben-Asher & Pollans, supra note 82, at 38; AMY E. DASE, HELL-HOLE ON THE BRAZOS:
A HISTORIC RESOURCES STUDY OF CENTRAL STATE FARM, FORT BEND COUNTY, TEXAS 5 (2004)
[perma.cc/5C75-XTAN] (finding that after the Civil War, Black prisoners were leased for labor
to sugar plantations, railroads, and other businesses for forced labor); S. POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE
TO
SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2013),
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/SPLCClose-to-Slavery-2013.pdf [perma.cc/83WJ-VHUF]; see also FARMWORKER JUST., NO WAY TO
TREAT A GUEST: WHY THE H-2A AGRICULTURAL VISA PROGRAM FAILS U.S. AND FOREIGN
WORKERS, http://www.farmworkerjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/7.2.a.6-No-WayTo-Treat-A-Guest-H-2A-Report.pdf [perma.cc/2MN4-XN7K].
84. E.g., DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 51–52 (1985) (describing federal power in the western United States
through capital investment in water infrastructure projects); id. at 130–31 (identifying the National Reclamation Act of 1902, which federalized construction and management of western irrigation projects, as “the most important single piece of legislation in the history of the West”).
85. Rosenberg & Stucki, supra note 82, at 14.
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Technology, such as refrigeration, mechanical harvesting, and agricultural biotechnology, also played a key role. 86 Federal policy has historically tended to
reinforce the consolidating effect of technology by affirmatively requiring certain technologies that favor scale (e.g., milk pasteurization) or by preferencing
farmers who used certain technologies in allocating agricultural subsidies. 87
Consolidation is widely criticized because of the power it confers on the
remaining players in the system to set prices, determine working conditions,
and formulate food. 88 Consolidation also contributes to homogenized food
systems primarily by nationalizing products, retailers, and restaurant chains,
such that the food landscape looks relatively similar from one town to the
next. For example, a recent study of Walmart, the largest food retailer in the
world, found that “[i]n 43 metropolitan areas and 160 smaller markets,
Walmart captures 50 percent or more of grocery sales . . . . In 38 of these regions, Walmart’s share of the grocery market is 70 percent or more.” 89 In
many rural areas, dollar stores also play newly significant roles in the retail
food environment. 90 Overall, in the past several decades, the number of food
products available for sale has increased at the national level, but it has decreased at the global level. 91

86. See WILLARD W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE: A
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 90–91, 384–85 (2d ed. 1993).
87. See Joshua Ulan Galperin, The Life of Administrative Democracy, 108 GEO. L.J. 1213,
1240–41 (2020) (describing how USDA county committees, which help to distribute subsidies,
favored wealthier farmers and supported the adoption of the newest technology).
88. See infra notes 212–217 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of consolidation in the poultry industry); Moss & Taylor, supra note 10, at 348 (arguing that consolidation squeezes both farmers and consumers); David A. Domina & C. Robert Taylor, The
Debilitating Effects of Concentration Markets Affecting Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 62
(2010). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-746R, U.S. AGRICULTURE: RETAIL
FOOD PRICES GREW FASTER THAN THE PRICES FARMERS RECEIVED FOR AGRICULTURAL
COMMODITIES, BUT ECONOMIC RESEARCH HAS NOT ESTABLISHED THAT CONCENTRATION HAS
AFFECTED THESE TRENDS 3 (2009).
89. STACY MITCHELL, INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE, WALMART’S MONOPOLIZATION
OF LOCAL GROCERY MARKETS 1–2 (2019), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06
/Walmart_Grocery_Monopoly_Report-_final_for_site.pdf [perma.cc/D4ER-8Z2A] (relying on
data from the Grocery Industry Market Share Report and finding that, overall, Walmart captures
one in four dollars spent on groceries in the United States).
90. See id. at 2; Stacy Mitchell & Marie Donahue, Report: Dollar Stores Are Targeting
Struggling Urban Neighborhoods and Small Towns. One Community Is Showing How to Fight
Back., INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (Dec. 6, 2018), https://ilsr.org/dollar-stores-target-citiestowns-one-fights-back [perma.cc/R3ZT-9XBJ] (noting that between 2011 and 2018 the number
of dollar stores grew from twenty thousand to nearly thirty thousand).
91. In the United States, the USDA’s Economic Research Service tracks introduction of
new food and beverage products. Its data show a significant increase in recent decades. New
Products, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV. (May 27, 2021), https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/food-markets-prices/processing-marketing/new-products [perma.cc/WJ7W-QCU3] (showing data from
1998 to 2018). Internationally, the trend is the reverse, as globalization crowds out diversity in
many contexts. Colin K. Khoury et al., Increasing Homogeneity in Global Food Supplies and the
Implications for Food Security, 111 PNAS 4001 (2014) (observing increasing similarity in national food supplies around the world).
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Helpless consumer laws exacerbate industry consolidation, and the resulting food homogenization, by creating barriers to entry and increasing capital requirements for standard business operations. Food safety regulations,
which often include burdensome disinfection and record-keeping requirements, contribute to consolidation in the food industry. 92 Where prior authorization is required for foods to enter into commerce, the “application of
authorization requirements is costly and time-consuming. Therefore, procedures can only be managed by high-capital enterprises.” 93 Two prominent examples are food additives, which are subject to an onerous premarket approval
system, 94 and produce sold to institutional buyers, which is commonly subject
to USDA’s Good Agricultural Practices food safety certification. 95 Organic
certification is also an example of this phenomenon. The high cost of certification, including transition costs from conventional production, is a significant causal factor in industry consolidation. 96
Food safety laws impose onerous requirements that are particularly burdensome for small-scale food businesses. 97 It is often the case that larger-scale
operations are better able to absorb the costs of regulatory compliance, but
this is not simply a problem of ability to pay. Instead, this is a problem of regulatory design. Many of these laws are designed in response to input from, and

92. See SPENCER HENSON & JOHN HUMPHREY, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. & WORLD HEALTH
ORG., THE IMPACTS OF PRIVATE FOOD SAFETY STANDARDS ON THE FOOD CHAIN AND ON
PUBLIC STANDARD-SETTING PROCESSES 7 (2009), http://www.fao.org/3/i1132e/i1132e.pdf
[perma.cc/8MXU-DPD6].
93. Bernd van der Meulen et al., Food Safety Regulation Applied to Traditional and Ethnic
Foods, in REGULATING SAFETY OF TRADITIONAL AND ETHNIC FOODS 441, 464 (Vishweshwaraiah Prakash et al. eds., 2016).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 348 (requiring prior authorization for new food additives unless they are
“generally recognized as safe” and establishing a zero-risk standard for carcinogenic additives).
In part because of the costly nature of the prior approval process, the “generally recognized as
safe” standard is widely used and, many argue, abused. MICHAEL T. ROBERTS, FOOD LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 87–91 (2016) (describing the food additives standard and its exceptions).
95. USDA’s Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) certification program is a voluntary food
safety audit, but many wholesale distributors, supermarket chains, and public institutional purchasers buy only from GAP-certified farms. See, e.g., Florence A. Becot, Virginia Nickerson, David S. Conner & Jane M. Kolodinsky, Costs of Food Safety Certification on Fresh Produce Farms
in Vermont, 22 HORTTECHNOLOGY 705 (2012) (assessing compliance costs and identifying buyers requiring compliance).
96. GUTHMAN, supra note 72 (describing how agribusiness came to dominate organic
production).
97. See, e.g., JOHN BOVAY, PEYTON FERRIER & CHEN ZHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EIB195, ESTIMATED COSTS FOR FRUIT AND VEGETABLE PRODUCERS TO COMPLY WITH THE FOOD
SAFETY MODERNIZATION ACT’S PRODUCE RULE (2018) (estimating that while the largest farms
will pay about 0.33 percent of annual sales to comply, the smallest will pay as much as 7 percent);
see also Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18, at 1232–33 (describing how FSMA and other food
safety laws impose greater costs, expressed as a percentage of profits, on smaller businesses than
on larger ones).
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examination of, large-scale operations. 98 When applied to small-scale businesses, they often appear arbitrary and irrational. 99 For instance, laws governing cheese production in New York treat small farmstead cheese makers the
same as industrial cheese makers that use milk from many farms. 100 Sanitation
requirements designed to account for risks associated with drawing milk from
numerous farms, transporting it to a single processor, and producing cheese
in large volumes, appear less rational for a farm milking twelve cows and processing the milk into cheese on site.
Sociologist Melanie DuPuis describes FSMA as one of the most recent developments in a decades-long “treadmill of purity,” on which regulation generates the need for scale to afford compliance, creating additional risk that
necessitates even more regulation. 101 She observes:
Experts agree that there is no way to make food completely safe. Yet, every
outbreak leads to another round of purification requirements that don’t
necessarily purify but that do lead to the further shakeout of smaller farms.
The ultimate end of this treadmill may be vegetables grown in vast “protected” production facilities—large dirt-free vertical greenhouses using hydroponics. 102

Recognizing this concern, some federal laws, including FSMA, create exceptions or reduced burdens for smaller food businesses, particularly those
making low-risk products. 103 But many producers experience pressure from

98. Diana Stuart & Michelle R. Worosz, Risk, Anti-reflexivity, and Ethical Neutralization
in Industrial Food Processing, 29 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 287, 291–92 (2012) (describing the role
of industry influence in approaches to meat safety and observing that meat safety standards are
modeled on existing industry practices); Kathryn A. Boys, Michael Ollinger & Leon L. Geyer,
The Food Safety Modernization Act: Implications for U.S. Small Scale Farms, 41 AM. J.L. & MED.
395, 405 n.13 (2015) (suggesting that FSMA rules were modeled on the California and Arizona
Leafy Green Marketing Agreement, quasi-private regulatory structures developed by the largescale leafy-greens industry).
99. See BOVAY ET AL., supra note 97, at 1–4; Gregory M. Schieber, Note, The Food Safety
Modernization Act’s Tester Amendment: Useful Safe Harbor for Small Farmers and Food Facilities or Weak Attempt at Scale-Appropriate Farm and Food Regulations?, 18 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L.
239, 245–46 (2013); Patrick Baur, Christy Getz & Jennifer Sowerwine, Contradictions, Consequences and the Human Toll of Food Safety Culture, 34 AGRIC. & HUM. VALUES 713, 722 (2017)
(suggesting that while large-scale businesses often view food safety regulations as “an abstract
formalization of common sense,” for smaller operators they appear as hoops to jump through,
generating significant costs).
100. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 46-a (McKinney 2019); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 1, § 2.1 (2020) (establishing that New York’s food safety standards for dairy production apply
to any facility not in compliance with federal standards for dairy production).
101. E. MELANIE DUPUIS, DANGEROUS DIGESTION: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN DIETARY
ADVICE 123 (2015). Many critics of modern food safety law express concern that scale itself is a
primary source of risk in the food supply because of the ways that scale magnifies and agglomerates risk. See Stuart & Worosz, supra note 98 (examining the safety risks associated with large
scale production of lettuce and meat).
102. DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 124.
103. See, e.g., Schieber, supra note 99, at 245–46.
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wholesale buyers and insurers to comply with the law regardless of these exemptions. 104
In some contexts, large-scale players in the food system have expressly
sought food safety laws as a competitive tool. For instance, the Leafy Green
Growers Association, which represents the leafy-greens industries of California and Arizona, supported passage of FSMA. 105 Members of the association
were already subject to produce safety requirements through the California
Leafy Green Marketing Agreement and sought to level the playing field by
establishing uniform national regulations. 106 In other words, their express
purpose for supporting the law was to improve their competitive position in
the leafy-greens industry.
2.

Sterilizing and Standardizing Food and Food Production

A second mechanism of homogenization is the tendency toward sterilization and standardization in food law. I have argued elsewhere that the current
structure of food safety law is irrational because it focuses narrowly on one of
food’s health-related features at the expense of others. 107 Here, I add to that
critique by arguing food safety regulation can reduce diversity in the food system, not just of scale, not just of microbes, 108 but also of methods of production and types of food produced.
The standard approach to food safety is sterilization of food production
environments and standardization of food production practices. 109 Sterilization and standardization make food safety easy to police, but they also shut
down diversity within the food system. In other words, food safety law “whitewashes” food safety, suppressing development of alternative food cultures and

104. Id. at 272 (noting that farmers will need to forgo their Tester-Hagan exemption status
to take advantage of certain kinds of marketing opportunities); Boys et al., supra note 98, at 400–
01; Jose Perez, Recordkeeping and Labeling: FSMA Requirements for Qualified Exempt Operations, UNIV. OF FLA. IFAS (Jan. 25, 2017), http://blogs.ifas.ufl.edu/smallfarms/2017/01/25/fsmaqualified-exempt [perma.cc/EU7X-9WVR].
105. Margot J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety and Environmental Protection in a Cooperative Governance Regime, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399, 416–17 (2015).
106. Id. (citing industry comments on FSMA rulemaking).
107. Id. at 418–20 (examining conflicts between produce safety and environmental protection); Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18 (considering food safety vis-à-vis the full range of
food system health risks).
108. Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18, at 1226–27 (describing the consequences of sterilizing farm environments).
109. See id.
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alternative food networks. 110 By contrast, advocates for food sovereignty identify true transparency, achieved by shortened supply chains, as a primary
mechanism for ensuring food safety. 111
From its earliest history in the Progressive Era, modern food safety law
has had an underlying “purity” agenda, seeking to secure the human body in
ways that were highly racialized. 112 Advocacy for regulation against “adulteration” of the food supply went hand in hand with advocacy for immigration
controls and even eugenics. 113 Stories about the use of food safety law to whiten
foodways are common. For instance, NPR profiled the “chili queens” of San
Antonio, who for decades served homemade chili from makeshift stands in San
Antonio until the town leaders determined that their appearance was inconsistent with the aesthetic of the community. 114 It was ultimately under the guise
of public health laws that they were fully shut down. 115
Many of these laws also have an international reach. Foreign food producers seeking to export products to the United States must comply with U.S.
food safety laws. 116 The United States engages not only in foreign-facility inspection but also in foreign food safety education. 117 In the United States and
abroad, these laws impose particular burdens on “traditional” and “ethnic”
foods. 118 For example, an exemption to strenuous food additive safety requirements for foods “generally recognized as safe” creates a potential bias against

110. Industrialization of agriculture, which typically entails dramatic narrowing of the
number of crop varietals produced, similarly contributes to loss of cultural diversity. Peter J.
Jacques & Jessica Racine Jacques, Monocropping Cultures into Ruin: The Loss of Food Varieties
and Cultural Diversity, 4 SUSTAINABILITY 2970, 2972 (2012) (“Cultural and biological diversity
co-evolve in complex and constitutive feedbacks . . . .”).
111. Sarah Schindler, Food Federalism: States, Local Governments, and the Fight for Food
Sovereignty, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 771–72 (2018).
112. See DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 80–87 (describing early advocacy for sanitation in food
production); Andrea Freeman, The Unbearable Whiteness of Milk: Food Oppression and the
USDA, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1251 (2013).
113. See DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 80–87; LORINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN, THE PURE
FOOD, DRINK, AND DRUG CRUSADERS, 1879–1914 (1999).
114. The Chili Queens of San Antonio, NPR (Oct. 15, 2004, 12:00 AM), https://www.npr
.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4107830 [perma.cc/G9DK-XUMX].
115. Id.
116. E.g., Food Safety Modernization Act § 301, 21 U.S.C. § 384a; see Linda R. Horton,
Food from Developing Countries: Steps to Improve Compliance, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 139 (1998).
The United States also exports homogenization through support for the spread of industrialized
agriculture and expansion of the “green revolution.” Jacques & Jacques, supra note 110 (explaining how the green revolution, which involved export of a package of monoculture cropping practices, hybrid seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, contributed to significant loss of cultural diversity
and traditional knowledge).
117. Horton, supra note 116, at 163–65 (describing and calling for expansion of U.S. food
safety training programs abroad).
118. See Vishweshwaraiah Prakash, Introduction: The Importance of Traditional and Ethnic Food in the Context of Food Safety, Harmonization, and Regulations, in REGULATING SAFETY
OF TRADITIONAL AND ETHNIC FOODS, supra note 93, at 1, 1–2 (defining “traditional” food as
“foods that are typically whole, naturally grown or raised, and used in their original form or have
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new ingredients brought into U.S. markets by more recent immigrant populations. 119 Many countries have laws that recognize experience, and “traditional
foods usually are considered safe on the basis of experience,” but “[t]his may be
different outside the cultural area where the foods at issue are traditional.” 120
Food safety laws in particular “devalue[] the expertise and experience of
the people working every day to grow, harvest, pack and distribute” food. 121
Devaluing lay expertise results in a narrowing of legitimate sources of
knowledge, rejecting experiential and generational knowledge in favor of formal
training. 122 This narrowing contributes to uniformity both in available foods
and in underlying safety and production practices by reducing the range of
acceptable practices. It also reduces control over vocabularies and knowledge,
limiting the ability of non-“experts” to participate in governance processes.
A similar pattern occurs in the context of public nutrition programs. In
this context, a scientific approach to nutrition, referred to as “nutritionism”
by one historian, reduces our food needs to a universal set of nutrients and
ignores the variety and complexity of diet, practice, and other nutritional contexts. 123 Historically, nutritionism has been used as a tool in colonial projects
to emphasize “the superiority of a scientifically[ ]established ideal diet over
local cultural and religious traditions.” 124 In the modern era, nutritionism is
entrenched in law through the Dietary Guidelines for Americans and nutrition facts panels. 125
Language-control laws function in a similar way. Vocabulary itself “helps
mark the boundaries of permissible discourse, discourages the clarification of
undergone only basic processing,” and defining “ethnic” food as “those edibles that are eaten
and prepared by groups of people who share a common religion, language, culture, or heritage”).
119. van der Meulen et al., supra note 93, at 442–44 (arguing that there is flexibility in
treatment of “traditional” and “ethnic” foods but noting that confusion in different standards
and different layers of regulation can create problems).
120. Id. at 463–64. It is, of course, important to distinguish between additives that are unfamiliar, and thus not generally recognized as safe, because they were not traditionally used in
U.S. food production, and new chemical formulations, which require more scrutiny. See
ROBERTS, supra note 94, at 90–91 (describing concerns about abuse of the “generally recognized
as safe” exception for new chemical formulations).
121. Baur et al., supra note 99, at 719.
122. Cf. Jacques & Jacques, supra note 110, at 2974 (“[T]he central difference between industrial and traditional agricultur[e] is epistemological.”).
123. See GYORGY SCRINIS, NUTRITIONISM: THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF DIETARY
ADVICE (2013).
124. David M. Kaplan, “Hunger Hermeneutics,” 40 TOPOI 527, 531, 535 (2020) (noting examples from British colonial rule).
125. Relatedly, but tangential to food law itself, antidiscrimination law allows disparate
treatment based on weight, typically measured through body mass index, a standard obesity
metric that fails to take into account racial differences in body morphology. JULIE GUTHMAN,
WEIGHING IN: OBESITY, FOOD JUSTICE, AND THE LIMITS OF CAPITALISM 96–97 (2011); SABRINA
STRINGS, FEARING THE BLACK BODY: THE RACIAL ORIGINS OF FAT PHOBIA (2019) (observing
early overlaps between nutrition science and eugenics). BMI is often used as a basis for employer-based health insurance incentive schemes. Yofi Tirosh, The Right to Be Fat, 12 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 264, 326 & n.246 (2012).
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social alternatives, and makes it difficult for the dispossessed to locate the
source of their unease.” 126 Organics laws in particular frequently become a
tool of cultural hegemony. What began as a counterculture movement reacting to the rise of industrial agriculture was appropriated by industrial agriculture. By taking control of the word “organic,” the industrial-agricultural
complex exerts influence over the agricultural counterculture. This influence
is powerful both domestically, where smaller organic operations must turn to
other mechanisms to communicate with their customers, 127 and internationally, where farmers must suddenly comply with internationally negotiated organic-harmonization agreements to continue using the term. 128 The
widespread resistance to the use of “milk” and “meat” on vegan products may
also reflect the underlying cultural hegemony “regarding not just the acceptability, but the necessity of animal consumption.” 129
In sum, food safety regulations and food fraud language-control laws
achieve safety and prevent misrepresentation at the expense of diversity of
scale, food types, and food production practices. They make alternative, ethnic, and counterculture foodways more challenging to import, establish, and
maintain. They reinforce a dominant food culture that undermines the food
sovereignty of any community whose preferences and practices are not
aligned with that of the dominant food culture. 130 In this sense, the myth of
the helpless consumer is self-actualizing, especially for consumers who are
outside of the dominant food culture.
3.

Homogenization as a Disempowerment Tool

Homogenization occurs for many reasons—technology, efficiency, culture, individual preferences—and is not inherently a bad thing. At a large

126. T.J. Jackson Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities, 90
AM. HIST. REV. 567, 569–70 (1985).
127. Willow Saranna Russell & Lydia Zepeda, The Adaptive Consumer: Shifting Attitudes,
Behavior Change and CSA Membership Renewal, 23 RENEWABLE AGRIC. & FOOD SYS. 136, 144
(2008) (identifying the weekly newsletter as a key feature of community-supported agriculture
because it provides farmers an opportunity to educate members). For an example, see Roxbury
Farm Newsletter, supra note 76; see also CORE ORGANIC, FARMER CONSUMER PARTNERSHIPS
COMMUNICATING ETHICAL VALUES: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 1–2 (Susanne Padel &
Katharina Gössinger eds., 2008), https://orgprints.org/id/eprint/12821/1/CORE_FCP_Vol1
_Final_31_July.pdf [perma.cc/2UHU-F5VX] (identifying the need for farmers and other food
producers to communicate commitment to ethical values that exceed those communicated by
compliance with regulatory frameworks).
128. See AISTARA, supra note 74, at 21–22 (describing the consequences of international
harmonization for farmers in countries that want to trade with the United States).
129. Amy J. Fitzgerald & Nik Taylor, The Cultural Hegemony of Meat and the Animal Industrial Complex, in THE RISE OF CRITICAL ANIMAL STUDIES: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE
CENTRE 165, 166 (Nik Taylor & Richard Twine eds., 2014).
130. See Declaration of Nyéléni, supra note 12 (describing the origins and definition of
“food sovereignty”).
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scale, however, homogenization is a common feature of social control precisely because it eliminates differences and fosters “purity.” 131 For instance, a
key feature of rising fascism in 1930s Germany was a push to eliminate class
differences, or at least class allegiances. 132 At its most extreme, in ultranationalist Nazi Germany, homogenization took on the genocidal form of mass murder—targeting those of religious, sexual, and physical difference. 133 Even in
Nazi Germany, purity movements were connected not just to racial and physical difference but also to public-health science: “The discovery of the role of
bacteria in contagion . . . and the mechanisms of heredity . . . made it possible
to imagine whole new categories of internal enemy: carriers of disease, the
unclean, and the hereditarily ill, insane, or criminal.” 134 Historian Tiago
Saraiva considers the role of food production homogenization in the rise of
fascist states, observing that the industrialization and standardization of food
production were key not just for the production of food that would support
the populace but also for developing governmental bureaucracies that would
eventually solidify totalitarian power. 135 Thus, while homogenization is sometimes appropriate and reasonable, it is often weaponized in both subtle (food
production) and aggressive (racial purging) ways.
So where do we draw the line between malignant homogenization as a
tool of social control and fully benign homogenization? This is, of course, not
a question with a precise answer, but homogenizing forces (including market
forces and legal prohibitions) cross the line when they begin to cut into racial
and cultural diversity or to undermine community sovereignty. As the above
discussion establishes, the law of the helpless consumer contributes to legally
mandated homogenizing of food and food production that targets immigrant
and minority communities and that reduces food sovereignty writ large.
II.

PARALYZING THE RESPONSIBLE CONSUMER

Standing in contrast to the myth of the helpless consumer is a second
equally powerful myth driving food law: the myth of the responsible consumer. Food is both a staple (everyone must eat) and a morally fraught domain (what and how much should we eat?). Moralizing around food is age131. See STANLEY, supra note 13, at 151; ROBERT O. PAXTON, THE ANATOMY OF FASCISM
41 (2004) (identifying as a “mobilizing passion[]” of fascism “the need for closer integration of
a purer community, by consent if possible, or by exclusionary violence if necessary”). In practice,
the successful rise of fascism often requires relaxing ideas about purity to broaden the tent
enough to take control. Id. at 40.
132. SARAIVA, supra note 14, at 6 (describing the building of the Autobahn as a key technological feature designed to level society).
133. PAXTON, supra note 131, at 134–35 (describing the role of medical professionals in
the Nazi genocide through “sterilization of the ‘unfit’ and the elimination of ‘useless mouths’—
the mentally and incurably ill—and from there to ethnic genocide”).
134. Id. at 36. Paxton notes that the urge to purify on these lines influenced liberal states
as well as fascist ones and that the United States and Sweden “led the way in the forcible sterilization of habitual offenders (in the American case, especially African Americans).” Id. at 36–37.
135. SARAIVA, supra note 14, at 11–13 (describing the role of particular food technologies).
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old, and many religious traditions are deeply imbued with complex food
rules. 136 In the United States today, food moralizing takes the predominant
form of blame: individuals commit alleged moral wrongs through a broad
range of food choices, such as overeating, eating animals, or even experiencing
hunger. Threads of blame in food policy put the onus on food consumers to
take control not just of their own nutrition but also of a wide variety of food
system ills. The responsible consumer needs no legal protections other than
those facilitating provision of the information that enables moral choices.
According to the myth, the responsible consumer uses information to
make food choices that reflect personal preferences and identity and that protect individual health and well-being. The responsible consumer also establishes food security for herself. Finally, the responsible consumer makes food
choices that protect the environment, food system workers, and animals used
in food production. While the myth of the helpless consumer contradicts narratives about consumer freedom, the myth of the responsible consumer relies
on them. The responsible consumer is free to choose whatever foods they want
and can therefore be deemed to have chosen freely whatever consequences
follow. One advocacy group, playing up the myth of the responsible consumer, put it this way:
A growing cabal of activists has meddled in Americans’ lives in recent
years. They include self-anointed “food police,” health campaigners, trial
lawyers, personal-finance do-gooders, animal-rights misanthropes, and
meddling bureaucrats.
Their common denominator? They all claim to know “what’s best for
you.” In reality, they’re eroding our basic freedoms—the freedom to buy
what we want, eat what we want, drink what we want, and raise our children
as we see fit. 137

By contrast to the helpless consumer, the responsible consumer is self-possessed, influential, and capable. And, while the myth of the helpless consumer
is self-actualizing, the myth of the responsible consumer is self-defeating.
The myth plays a role in a variety of food laws that control information.
“Knowledge” serves as a central rallying cry for food system reform in three
different but overlapping contexts: nutrition regulation, food security, and the
consumer food movement. In each of these contexts, information is offered as
a tool of empowerment. In practice, however, information reinforces a twotiered food system, one in which only some consumers have the time, money,
access to information, and inclination to research their food choices and
spend more money on food. 138 In all three contexts, consumers are charged

136. See DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 100–01 (describing the historic role of morality in food
reform movements).
137. About Us, CTR. FOR CONSUMER FREEDOM, https://www.consumerfreedom.com
/about [perma.cc/T9YC-VRBE].
138. DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 99 (“The ‘food revolution’ described by so many food reformers was, in fact, a partition of the food system into two distinct systems: one determined by
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with responsibility to help themselves and others and are blamed if they do
not do so successfully. 139 These movements rely on the assumption that individuals have full agency over their food consumption decisions. 140 Within this
framework, the primary barriers to change are thus inadequate transparency
and individual irresponsibility. At the same time, the rhetoric of the responsible
consumer empowers the food industry to resist efforts at public governance on
the ground that consumer demand is the only legitimate impetus for change.
In theory, information-based laws facilitate healthy consumer decisions
without legally mandating either consumer behavioral change or product reformulation. In practice, however, the shift to information-based policy and advocacy allows for the subtle use of information control to disempower many food
consumers. In other words, debunking the myth of the responsible consumer
reveals not that consumers are irresponsible but that they are not empowered
to engage in the kind of self-help that actualization of the myth requires.
A. Domains of Consumer Responsibility
1.

Personal Health

In recent years, concern about rising rates of diet-related disease has led
to a spate of new policies aimed at improving diet. From Happy Meal restrictions to fast food zoning laws, soda taxes, and school lunch nutrition
standards, many of these laws recognize that our economic circumstances and
physical environments influence food choices. 141 These laws have met with
staunch opposition. Proponents of responsibilization rely on rhetoric of “freedom” to resist these food environment laws. 142 For instance, the rhetoric of
“freedom” is prevalent in calls for state laws that preempt local attempts to
regulate fast-food restaurants and impose taxes on sodas. 143 Thus, the primary

increasing speed and decreasing cost and a separate quality-based system that, by comparison,
requires more time, labor, and materials.”); see infra Section III.C (elaborating on this critique).
139. Both are examples of neoliberal “responsibilization.” Wendy Brown defines “responsibilization” as the shifting of “moral burden[]” to “the entity at the end of the pipeline” of power
and authority. In other words, it is the shifting of responsibility from government and business
to private individuals. See WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH
REVOLUTION 132 (2015).
140. Id. at 41–42 (describing the “responsibilized turn” in the “neoliberal political imaginary”); Andrew Calabrese, Caveat Emptor! The Rhetoric of Choice in Food Politics, COMMC’N +1,
Oct. 2017,art. 2, https://doi.org/10.7275/R5CZ35CR (arguing that corporate lobbyists use the
rhetoric of freedom of choice to resist policies that protect consumers from unhealthy foods).
141. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Obesity and Public Policy: A Roadmap for Reform, 22 VA. J.
SOC. POL’Y & L. 491 (2015) (cataloguing possible policy responses to the rise of diet-related disease).
142. See supra note 139 (defining responsibilization).
143. Consider also opposition to the New York City soda-portion control law and nannystate concerns related to the Affordable Care Act and broccoli eating. See Lawrence O. Gostin,
Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–
Oct. 2013, at 19, 20–21; Lindsay F. Wiley, Micah L. Berman & Doug Blanke, Who’s Your Nanny?
Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41 J.L. MED. &
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function of responsibilization is to oppose “nanny-state” health laws. 144 Although information provisions, such as restaurant menu calorie labeling, have
also met with resistance, label policies have been more successful on the national stage than more directive regulatory programs. 145
Responsibilization ascribes diet-related personal health to personal
choice. Failure—as evidenced by obesity or by diet-related disease—follows
from poor discipline. 146 The responsible consumer myth characterizes these
as moral failings.
2.

Household Food Security

Responsibilization has been a dominant thread in social welfare reform
since the mid-1990s. At that time, lawmakers reformed federal social-safety
networks, abandoning categorical eligibility rules focusing on objective factors, such as income, assets, and family size, in favor of benefit-eligibility rules
that “emphasi[ze] . . . claimants’ choices.” 147 A primary feature of this shift
was the addition of work requirements to welfare and food assistance programs.
In recent years, lawmakers have pushed to strengthen work requirements
in food assistance programs. In 2018, House Republicans proposed extending
work requirements to some parents with dependent children over six years
old and strengthening documentation requirements. 148 When the proposal
failed, the USDA subsequently, and also unsuccessfully, attempted its own
similar reforms. Specifically, the agency proposed a rule that would have eliminated some flexibility for states to waive work requirements. 149 Individual
states have also taken steps to limit eligibility on other responsibility grounds.

ETHICS (SPECIAL ISSUE) 88, 88–89 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1111/jlme.12048 (exploring “public
health paternalism”); Rhode, supra note 141, at 501–03, 507.
144. Language of responsibilization is not new. See DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 101 (situating modern food responsibilization within a lengthy tradition of “civic republican purification
of personal lifestyle as the solution to social problems”); see also STANLEY, supra note 13, at 151–
52 (identifying “self-sufficiency” as a fascist virtue).
145. Broad Leib & Pollans, supra note 18, at 1187–89 (describing the current landscape of
U.S. nutrition regulation).
146. See Tirosh, supra note 125, at 279–81 (describing fat stereotypes).
147. David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for
Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 820 (2004).
148. H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4015 (as passed by House, June 21, 2018). The proposal ultimately failed in the Senate. Compare H.R. 2, 115th Cong. § 4103 (as passed by Senate, June 28,
2018), with Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-334, § 4005, 132 Stat. 4490.
149. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults
Without Dependents, 84 Fed. Reg. 66,782 (Dec. 5, 2019) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 273); see
also District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 496 F. Supp. 3d 213 (D.D.C. 2020) (finding the
rule invalid on both procedural and substantive grounds and ordering vacatur), appeal dismissed, No. 20-5371, 2021 WL 1439861 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 2021); Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Rescission of Requirements for Able-Bodied Adults Without Dependents:
Notice of Vacatur, 86 Fed. Reg. 34,605 (June 30, 2021).
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For instance, in 2018, Wisconsin embedded drug testing into its eligibility requirements. 150
Proponents for reform justify calls for work requirements by relying on
narratives of laziness. In the 1990s, the image of the “welfare queen” depicted
young women, typically Black single mothers, as choosing not to work because they could collect federal benefits and, in the extreme, of having additional children specifically to collect the additional benefits to which a larger
family would entitle them. 151 These narratives characterize hunger as resulting
from unwillingness to work hard and characterize program participants as
leeches living off the efforts of hard-working Americans. 152 Hunger itself is
evidence of a moral wrong. 153 Although reform proponents typically do not
advocate eliminating social welfare programs entirely, they seek to focus these
programs on the “morally worthy” (children, the elderly, and the disabled)
and to decrease access for the “morally unworthy” (able-bodied adults).
Responsibilization thus deemphasizes structural causes of poverty and
places the blame on the poor. 154 This ideology is unidimensional; if you are
hungry, you should work harder so you can afford more food.
3.

Equity and Sustainability

In recent decades, a growing set of food-related social movements call on
consumers to “vote with their forks” for a better food system. 155 These movements articulate a wide variety of goals, from children’s health to fair wages,

150. WIS. STAT. § 49.791 (2019–2020) (governing substance-abuse screening, testing, and
treatment for employment and training programs); see H. Claire Brown, Buried in Wisconsin
Republicans’ Lame-Duck Legislation: Drug Testing Requirements for Food Stamp Applicants,
INTERCEPT (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/12/06/wisconsin-foodstamps-drug-testing [perma.cc/V6P2-VE7Z]. No other state currently requires drug testing for
nonfelon SNAP participants. Id.
151. See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Reclaiming the Welfare Queen: Feminist and Critical Race
Theory Alternatives to Existing Anti-poverty Discourse, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 257, 265 (2016)
(describing the political salience of the welfare-queen image).
152. See id. at 266 (observing that although the welfare queen herself is rarely invoked today,
“the construct still has broad regulatory power”); Ben-Asher & Pollans, supra note 82, at 54–55.
153. This trend revives an old idea that poverty was commonly believed to be a result of a
moral failing. Super, supra note 147, at 818–19 (observing that from the early republic through
the Great Depression, the “poorhouse remained a potent symbol of [] moral opprobrium”). For
a general history of the transformation of public conceptions of hunger in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, see JAMES VERNON, HUNGER: A MODERN HISTORY (2007).
154. Khiara M. Bridges, The Deserving Poor, the Undeserving Poor, and Class-Based Affirmative Action, 66 EMORY L.J. 1049, 1077–79 (2017) (describing how conceptions of “deserving” and “undeserving poor” are believed to have shaped reform of social safety nets); LISA
DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT OF EQUALITY? NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL POLITICS, AND THE
ATTACK ON DEMOCRACY 15 (2003) (describing welfare reform as an effort “to transfer the function of providing a social safety net from public agencies to private households” and observing
that this reform funnels people into low-wage work to the benefit of corporate profits).
155. The phrase was coined by the Boston-based nonprofit organization Oldways Preservation and Exchange Trust in the 1990s. Barry Popik, “Vote with Your Fork,” BIG APPLE (Nov.
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animal welfare, and environmental protection. 156 The common thread in
these movements is the theory of change: if enough consumers express their
preferences, the market will shift and provide more food that meets the standard of whatever cause consumers support.
Activists in this area typically characterize ethical food consumption decisions as political acts. Exemplifying this view, Michael Pollan wrote the following a few weeks after Tax Day in 2006:
Whatever your politics, there are activities your tax money supports that I’m
sure you find troublesome, if not deplorable. But you can’t do anything about
those activities—you can’t withdraw your support—unless you’re prepared
to go [to] jail. Food is different. You can simply stop participating in a system
that abuses animals or poisons the water or squanders jet fuel flying asparagus around the world. You can vote with your fork, in other words, and you
can do it three times a day. 157

Rather than critique government for failing to regulate, the “vote with your
fork” rallying cry asks consumers to take responsibility for all the food system’s ills, from how workers are treated to the environmental footprint of food
production. 158 This rhetoric tacitly accepts that consumers rather than governments are responsible for these issues. Indeed, as other scholars have thoroughly documented, government has not taken on this responsibility;
protections for workers and the environment in the food system are extremely
limited. 159 The consumer food movement invites consumers to step into a regulatory role as the dominant force holding food producers accountable for the
costs of their activities. 160

14, 2010), https://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/vote_with_your_fork
[perma.cc/SY75-6F6Z].
156. See, e.g., Linda Buzzell, Vote with Your Fork!, HUFFPOST (May 25, 2011),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/vote-with-your-fork_b_234086 [perma.cc/S3SS-T67G] (describing the “purchase of genuinely organic, local and/or sustainably grown food” as “a vote
against factory farming, Frankenfoods, animal torture and the pesticide companies”); Voting
with Your Fork, MICHAEL POLLAN (May 7, 2006), https://michaelpollan.com/articles-archive/voting-with-your-fork [perma.cc/FPK4-VM5J] (suggesting that people stop participating
in a system that “abuses animals or poisons the water”).
157. Pollan, supra note 156; see also Marion Nestle, Ethical Dilemmas in Choosing a
Healthful Diet: Vote with Your Fork!, 59 PROC. NUTRITION SOC’Y 619 (2000).
158. See, e.g., Joshua Galperin, Graham Downey & D. Lee Miller, Eating Is Not Political
Action, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 113 (2017) (describing and critiquing this phenomenon). To be
sure, there are numerous advocacy organizations that are putting pressure on regulators to address these issues; the key point here, however, is about the prevalence and popularity of the
consumers-as-regulators model.
159. On the paucity of environmental protections, see Ruhl, supra note 4, and Margot J.
Pollans, Drinking Water Protection and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195
(2016). On the paucity of worker protections, see infra Section III.A.
160. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, some consumers felt this burden particularly acutely as they tried to balance keeping their own families safe and fed with supporting
employment and worker-protection practices in the food industry. In the absence of adequate
government support for restaurants and other food businesses, the latter two concerns were of-

672

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:643

To enable consumers to make informed decisions, advocates in these
movements promote transparency, chiefly through product labels. 161 Labels
convey information about food products and production processes. Although
most labels are unverified claims made by food producers themselves, an increasing number of third-party certification programs police particular
claims. 162 For instance, as many consumers and farmers have become disappointed with the organic label, various organizations have begun to develop
“organic plus” certification programs. 163 Numerous other certification
schemes—such as Fair Trade, Animal Welfare Approved, Non-GMO Project
Verified, and Marine Stewardship Council Certified Sustainable Seafood—focus on particular characteristics of food production. 164 These movements also
rely on investigative journalism. Exposés of working conditions, sanitary conditions of food processing facilities, and ingredients of specific foods can
shape consumer behavior and even generate industry and legal reform. 165
The responsible consumer can protect herself and others through her
food choices. Unlike the helpless consumer, the responsible consumer needs
the government only to ensure sufficient transparency to enable good decisionmaking. Consequently, the myth is used both to justify scaling back existing regulation and to block creation of new regulation.

ten in conflict. Contributing to the financial viability of a business, and thus the continued employment of its workers, typically meant obligating those workers to face high levels of coronavirus exposure. See, e.g., Ellie Krupnick, Fluke Tartare with Quinoa and Strawberries Is Not
Worth Someone’s Life, EATER (July 28, 2020, 10:34 AM), https://www.eater.com/2020
/7/28/21340453/dining-out-covid-19-ethics-decisions [perma.cc/9ZMP-FVF5]; Joe Pinsker, Is
It Ethically Okay to Get Food Delivered Right Now? A Guide to This and Other Pandemic Food
Dilemmas, ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2020/04
/grocery-delivery-takeout-eating-ethically-pandemic/610111 [perma.cc/C3LJ-SDN8].
161. For a taxonomy of ecolabels, see Jason Czarnezki, Margot Pollans & Sarah M. Main,
Eco-Labeling, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 996, 999–
1003 (Emma Lees & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2019).
162. Id. at 1004–08 (describing various approaches to ecolabel governance).
163. For instance, the Real Organic Project has a its own certification program based on a
series of provisional standards that extend beyond USDA’s requirements, particularly regarding
soil health and animal welfare. Why the Real Organic Project Exists, REAL ORGANIC PROJECT,
https://www.realorganicproject.org/what-does-usda-organic-mean-today [perma.cc/ES9L-6VF4]
(explaining that lack of enforcement from the USDA means that “[f]amily farmers meeting the
letter and spirit of organic law are suffering while consumers are once again in need of transparency in the market place”).
164. See All Ecolabels in United States on Food, ECOLABEL INDEX, http://www.ecolabelindex.com/ecolabels/?st=country=us;category=food [perma.cc/Y5PF-HQ26] (listing sixty-five
ecolabel programs used in the United States).
165. In some cases, these exposés can also result in legal reform. See Broad Leib & Pollans,
supra note 18, at 1194–96 (discussing several examples in the food safety context).
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B. Information Controls and Constructed Helplessness
The myth of the responsible consumer feeds a key feature of food law:
knowledge promotion. 166 The responsible consumer is meant to sort through
all the information available to them and often demands additional information. In theory, the responsible consumer can then use this information to
make self-actualized and self-interested decisions.
Although there is widespread consensus about the value of information—
among conservatives arguing against more invasive health regulations and liberals pushing for systemic reform—the primacy of information makes consumers vulnerable. The myth of the responsible consumer is part of a broader
trend in neoliberal regulatory reform in which information regulation alone
is considered sufficient and regulation of substantive issues such as nutritional
content is deemed invasive and unnecessary. 167 But information regulation is
deceptive. It is ultimately a tool to maintain an unequal distribution of power
in the food system because in practice it renders the theoretically responsible
consumer helpless.
Through information control, food law undermines the utility of information to achieve any of the substantive goals discussed in Section II.A, above.
First, a variety of laws protect food producers, processors, and manufacturers
from having to share information that might be damaging to their reputations.
Some laws even punish individuals who might disseminate this information
or use it as the basis of public critique. Second, food law suppresses dissent
through excess information. Generated by a proliferation of mandatory information-disclosure laws and legal facilitation of voluntary disclosures, excess
information hinders consumer capacity to exercise true responsibility.
1.

Suppressing Dissent

The food system is replete with examples of restrictions on information
access and food system critique. First, ag-gag laws seek to squelch critical
speech about agricultural facilities by placing restrictions on investigating and
reporting about those facilities. 168 These laws typically make it illegal to lie to
gain entrance to agricultural facilities and to film or photograph them. 169 Ag166. See LISA HEINZERLING, FOOD LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 7–8 (2015 ed. 2015) (identifying knowledge promotion as one of the three main goals of food law).
167. For discussion of this trend in the context of environmental law, see Richard B. Stewart,
A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 134–36 (2001); Jason J.
Czarnezki & Katherine Fiedler, The Neoliberal Turn in Environmental Law, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 1.
168. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Wasden, 878 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2018) (framing
ag-gag laws as constraints on investigative journalism); Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High
Value Lies, Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2015) (noting that
from 2012 to 2015, twenty-five states introduced ag-gag legislation and eight states enacted laws).
169. Chen & Marceau, supra note 168, at 1470 & n.207 (explaining that these laws extend
beyond traditional trespass and fraud by specifically targeting those investigating agricultural
facilities and criminalizing investigation, even if it produces no injury beyond the exposure of
criminal animal treatment).
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gag laws target animal rights activists, seeking to protect the animal agriculture
industry from public exposure of its practices. 170 Although some aspects of
these laws have been successfully challenged on First Amendment grounds,
they remain on the books in several states. 171 These laws simultaneously limit
access to information about conditions on farms generally and large-scale
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in particular, and they disincentivize reporting about those conditions by creating the risk of prosecution. 172
Second, like ag-gag laws, food disparagement laws disincentive food critique. These laws, on the books in thirteen states, create a civil cause of action
against critics of food products. 173 A more robust form of product disparagement (trade libel) law, food disparagement statutes seek to limit dissemination
of false information about perishable food or agricultural products. 174 Many
of these laws shift the traditional burden of proof by placing the burden of
proving truth on the defendant rather than placing the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff. 175 These laws have been invoked in several high-profile
cases involving national reporting on food. Most famously, after ABC aired a
segment on a meat product it referred to as “pink slime,” several manufacturers sued pursuant to South Dakota’s food disparagement statute. 176 ABC ultimately settled for $177 million. 177 Although on paper these laws punish only

170. Id. at 1470–71 (“[W]hen the information revealed through the use of deception relates
to a matter of great political significance or public debate, and the information revealed is not of
an intimate personal nature, the deceptions used to gain such information should enjoy protected status under the First Amendment.”).
171. See, e.g., Wasden, 878 F.3d at 1190 (striking parts of Idaho’s ag-gag law); Animal Legal
Def. Fund v. Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d 1193, 1196 (D. Utah 2017) (striking Utah’s law); Ag-Gag
Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/issue/ag-gag [perma.cc/TLG2-VS3D].
172. See, e.g., Herbert, 263 F. Supp. 3d at 1213 (describing Utah’s law as “[s]uppressing
broad swaths of protected speech without justification”).
173. David J. Bederman, Food Libel: Litigating Scientific Uncertainty in a Constitutional
Twilight Zone, 10 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 191, 195–96 (1998) (citing statutes for all thirteen states and
noting which states have considered but not ultimately passed legislation).
174. Id. at 196–97 (explaining that the purpose of these laws is to protect the perishablefoods industry from scares that lead to dramatic drops in demand).
175. Id. at 212–13 (suggesting that this burden may make these laws unconstitutional).
176. JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42473, LEAN FINELY TEXTURED BEEF: THE
“PINK SLIME” CONTROVERSY 2 (2012) (describing the public outcry and the immediate decline
in demand following reporting); Mortazavi, supra note 26, at 972–73 (noting that despite the
litigation, public outcry was strong enough that many companies voluntarily reduced used of
the product); BPI Announces Defamation Lawsuit over ‘Pink Slime,’ ABC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012,
8:22
PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/bpi-announces-defamation-lawsuit-pinkslime/story?id=17222933 [perma.cc/772G-AYLF]; Ben Nuelle, ‘Pink Slime’ Defamation Lawsuit
Begins in South Dakota, AGRI-PULSE (June 5, 2017, 6:53 PM), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9328-pink-slime-defamation-lawsuit-begins-in-south-dakota [perma.cc/C83H-VRYX].
177. James Nord, ABC Settled ‘Pink Slime’ Defamation Suit for More Than $177 Million,
CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 10, 2017, 7:43 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-pink-slimedefamation-suit-20170810-story.html [perma.cc/2EQ6-8WDG].
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false statements, in practice they discourage critique by generating fear of
prosecution. 178
Third, public-information policies hide critical information from public
view. For instance, a series of statutes, federal agency actions, and court decisions have limited access to public records on CAFO size and location. 179 Perhaps more significantly, in 2018 the USDA announced a decision to move its
Economic Research Service (ERS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA) out of the Washington, D.C., area. 180 ERS conducts research
into emerging issues in food, agriculture, the environment, and rural America,
and its research frequently influences decisionmaking by Congress, the
USDA, state agencies, industry groups, and individual farmers. 181 The USDA
explained the move as bringing the research service closer to its many stakeholders. 182 Critics, however, questioned this motive. For example, one group
of fifty-six former USDA and federal statistical-agency officials raised concerns about risks to agency independence and credibility, specifically citing
retaining staff expertise, continuing valuable collaborations both within and
outside the USDA in the D.C. area, maintaining visibility with policymakers. 183 Others suggested that the purpose of the move was to silence an agency

178. Bederman, supra note 173, at 213–14 (raising concern that these laws will chill expression of opinions because of the burden many of them put on defendants to offer “reasonable
and reliable scientific” support for their challenged statements).
179. D. LEE MILLER & GREGORY MUREN, NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CAFOS: WHAT WE
DON’T KNOW IS HURTING US 4–5 (2019), https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/cafos-dontknow-hurting-us-report.pdf [perma.cc/79N7-RVLX].
180. Notice of Request for Expression of Interest for Potential Sites for Headquarters Office Locations, 83 Fed. Reg. 40,499 (Aug. 15, 2018). Although the move was completed, a recent
report from the USDA’s inspector general suggests it might be illegal because the agency did not
have requisite congressional approval for spending appropriated money to make the move. OFF.
OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., INSPECTION REP. NO. 91801-0001-23, USDA’S
PROPOSAL TO REORGANIZE AND RELOCATE THE ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE AND NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE (2019), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/918010001-23.pdf [perma.cc/EQ7S-3H3W].
181. About ERS, USDA ECON. RSCH. SERV. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov
/about-ers [perma.cc/PW32-KMFL].
182. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., USDA Extends Deadline for Expressions of Interest for New ERS & NIFA Headquarters (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.usda.gov/media/press-releases/2018/09/07/usda-extends-deadline-expressions-interest-new-ers-nifa [perma.cc/3W69SF3C] (suggesting also that the move would increase the ability of ERS and NIFA to attract talent
from land grant universities).
183. Letter from 56 Individuals to Chairs Hoeven and Aderholt and Ranking Members
Bishop and Merkley (Oct. 9, 2018), https://copafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ERS-Reorg
AgencyHeadsAppropsCMTE.pdf [perma.cc/3PG8-KJ4K]; see also AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. ASS’N,
AAEA REVIEW FINDS THAT USDA BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS UNDERESTIMATES THE TRUE COST
OF RELOCATING RESEARCHERS TO KANSAS CITY 1 (2019), https://www.aaea.org/UserFiles/file
/Report-MovingUSDAResearchersWillCostTaxpayers-AAEAReport2019june19final.docx.pdf
[perma.cc/EMT5-WJEP] (conducting an independent analysis of the proposed move and finding it will cost taxpayers between $83 and $182 million); Liz Crampton, Economists Stunned by
USDA Decision to Move ERS, POLITICO (Aug. 15, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.politico.com
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whose research conclusions often contradicted Trump administration talking
points. 184 The Biden administration has no plans to reverse the move, which
is likely to cause long-term damage to the agency’s ability to gather and disseminate information because so many career personnel decided to leave rather than relocate. 185
The USDA also recently came under scrutiny for its treatment of agency
reports related to climate change. In September 2019, the Senate Democratic
Policy and Communication Committee released a report charging that the
USDA had failed to publicize hundreds of scientific studies evaluating the impacts of climate change on agricultural production. 186 The report also identified
numerous instances in which the Trump administration had directed individual agencies, including the U.S. Forest Service (a subdivision of the USDA), to
remove references to climate change and climate science from their websites. 187
Finally, efforts to intimidate academics who criticize industrial animal agriculture are increasingly prevalent. In 2010, the Maryland legislature threatened to withhold funding from the University of Maryland Environmental
Law Clinic because of its role in a lawsuit against Perdue Poultry. 188 As another example, Murphy Brown, a North Carolina pork processor and subsidiary of Smithfield Foods, subpoenaed UNC epidemiologist and professor
Steven Wing, who had been researching the environmental impacts of hog

/newsletters/morning-agriculture/2018/08/15/economists-stunned-by-usda-decision-to-moveers-317393 [perma.cc/56BQ-2WKH].
184. Sam Bloch, Why Is Trump Slashing the USDA’s Independent Research Arm? Look at
Its Findings, COUNTER (Aug. 20, 2018, 12:48 PM), https://thecounter.org/usda-economic-research-service-ers-reorganization [perma.cc/6YGZ-9J58] (noting how ERS research on issues
such as food assistance, crop insurance, and farmer incomes was discordant with the politics of
the Trump administration).
185. Jessica Fu, Vilsack Confirms That USDA Research Arms Will Not Return to Washington, D.C., COUNTER (Apr. 29, 2021, 12:19 PM), https://thecounter.org/vilsack-usda-researchkansas-city-missouri-washington-dc-ers-nifa [https://perma.cc/9LLU-LXKC]; Liz Crampton &
Ryan McCrimmon, Trump Administration to Move USDA Researchers to Kansas City Area,
POLITICO (June 13, 2019, 4:46 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/13/usda-kansascity-area-1529072 [perma.cc/YZT3-5MX8].
186. DEMOCRATIC POL’Y & COMMC’NS COMM., THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION IS
JEOPARDIZING OUR FUTURE BY ATTACKING SCIENCE AND CLIMATE RESEARCH (2019), https://
www.stabenow.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DPCC%20Attacks%20on%20Science%20Report.pdf
[perma.cc/PE53-4URQ] (assessing the Trump administration’s treatment of climate science
across multiple agencies).
187. Id.
188. See Annie Linskey, Funding Restored to Maryland Law Clinic, BALT. SUN (Apr. 6,
2010), https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/bs-xpm-2010-04-07-bal-md-ci-lawschool07apr07story.html [perma.cc/9MHD-YWFS].
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CAFOs. 189 The company demanded that he produce detailed research records, including information protected by confidentiality agreements required
by federal law for research involving human subjects. 190
Each of these examples demonstrates a jab at the free flow of information
about food and, in some cases, an attempt to punish critics. These constraints
on information collection, analysis, and distribution limit consumer capacity
to make informed decisions. Perhaps more significantly, they also hinder advocates attempting to use litigation and legislative strategies to achieve systemic reform.
2.

Promoting Confusion

Transparency itself undermines the responsible consumer by sowing confusion. On the surface, the food system is full of information. Indeed, as consumers, we are subject to “information flooding,” a veritable barrage of labels
that convey information about personal health, animal welfare, and environmental protection, among other things. 191 Many food movement advocates
urge consumers to use these labels to make more ethical food choices. But despite this transparency, the average consumer still has very little information
about whether their food is healthy for themselves, food system workers, or the
environment. 192 And the average consumer has very little capacity to sort
through the information to determine which is reliable and which is relevant. 193
Meaningless labels like “natural” share prominence with potentially more
meaningful labels, such as “no added sugar” or “employee-owned.” 194 For the
food consumer, this information glut can be paralyzing and thus disempowering.
Food manufacturers use hundreds of labels, some certified by third-parties, others not, to convey information about various aspects of their products.
Labels address environmental attributes, supply chain worker treatment, animal welfare, health features, and more. Although a few labels are tightly regulated, most are governed only by general fraud and truth-in-marketing
189. University of North Carolina – Asheville, RACHEL CARSON COUNCIL, https://rachelcarsoncouncil.org/campus-program/university-north-carolina-asheville [perma.cc/S3EB-UU5V];
Barry Yeoman, The Stink and Injustice of Life Next to an Industrial Hog Farm, NATION (Dec.
20, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/hog-farm-lawsuit-south [perma.cc/LR44HYCS].
190. See University of North Carolina – Asheville, supra note 189; Yeoman, supra note 189.
191. Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Information Flooding, 48 IND. L. REV. 755, 756 (2015) (defining “information flooding” as the dumping of information for the purpose of “hid[ing] bad
facts”). On chaos in food labeling in particular, see Jason Czarnezki, Andrew Homan & Meghan
Jeans, Creating Order Amidst Food Eco-Label Chaos, 25 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 281 (2015).
192. Czarnezki et al., supra note 161, at 1014–16 (describing the limitations of consumer
capacity to process available information).
193. Id.
194. See Use of the Term “Natural” in the Labeling of Human Food Products; Request for
Information and Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,905 (Nov. 12, 2015) (cataloguing requests that FDA
provide clarification on the meaning of “natural”).
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laws. 195 This is a case in which the cacophony of opinions contributes not to a
“marketplace of ideas” but to a drowning out of reason. 196
The rise of labeling is self-perpetuating. As consumers come to rely on
and expect labels, they advocate for more of them, focusing on “the right to
know” rather than on system reform. In some cases, information access can
facilitate reform, but in practice the right to know supplants more substantive
regulatory aims. Consider, for instance, the history of advocacy around genetically modified foods. Advocacy calling for substantive standards for the introduction of GMOs was drowned out by the Just Label It movement, which
culminated in a nearly meaningless federal-labeling law. 197 The law and the
implementing regulations use the less recognized phrase “bioengineered” and
its acronym “BE” rather than the more commonly understood “genetically
modified” or “genetically engineered.” 198 The USDA selected a labeling symbol that requires either the phrase “bioengineered” or “derived from bioengineering” and includes a graphic of a sun over a field of row crops. 199 The
USDA’s regulations are currently the subject of litigation charging that the
rules facilitate “de facto concealment of [genetically engineered] foods and
avoidance of their labeling.” 200 Genuine concerns about seed sovereignty and
pesticide pollution are dismissed as fringe, and consumers are placated by the
theoretical right to choose for themselves.

195. Czarnezki et al., supra note 161, at 1004 (describing the legal frameworks surrounding
eco-labels); see also supra Section I.C (discussing organics labeling).
196. See STANLEY, supra note 13, at 66–71 (rejecting John Stuart Mill’s claim that no opinions should be silenced).
197. See, e.g., Katherine Wenner, Comment, Quick Response Codes for Genetically Engineered Foods: A “Quick Fix” to America’s Deep-Rooted Debate Surrounding Genetically Engineered Foods, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 623, 623 (2018) (characterizing the law as an attempt by
Congress “to sidestep the underling unease regarding these food products”); Zoe S. Spector,
Note, The National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard: A Solution to the GMO Labeling
Political Debate?, 2018 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 457, 465–74 (criticizing the law on a variety of
grounds including the choice to allow manufacturers to opt for electronic disclosure using QR
codes and the law’s broad exemptions).
198. National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 7 C.F.R. pt. 66 (2021); 7 U.S.C.
§ 1639(b); see also Lucas A. Westerman, Consumer Choice or Confusion: That GMO Label
Doesn’t Mean What You Think It Means, 23 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 199, 223–27 (2018) (arguing that
these labels are misleading and that consumers would be better served by voluntary third-party
certification schemes).
199. BE Symbols, USDA AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., https://www.ams.usda.gov/rules-regulations/be/symbols [perma.cc/H3ZZ-WACS]. Rejected alternatives included other versions of yellow and green smiley face suns with the letters “BE.” AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL BIOENGINEERING FOOD DISCLOSURE STANDARD (2018),
https://www.ams.usda.gov/sites/default/files/media/BELabelingOverviewWebinarSlides.pdf
[perma.cc/9QWB-GVDC].
200. First Amended Complaint at 1–2, Nat. Grocers v. Perdue, No. 20-cv-5151, 2021 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 121201 (N.D. Cal. filed July 27, 2020) (challenging the language and imagery of the
label and the USDA’s choice to allow producers to replace the label with a QR code). Plaintiffs
in the lawsuit alleged violations of the Bioengineered Food Disclosure Act itself, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. Id. at 1–4.
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Information Control as a Disempowerment Tool

Information control has long been understood as a mechanism for consolidating power. 201 This may occur in a variety of forms—lying, controlling
access to information, exaggerating, and breaking down the line between truth
and fiction. 202 Information control silences dissent when the factual bases for
critique are obscured or when the criticism itself is discouraged through threat
of violence or prosecution. And muddying the truth prevents dissent by distracting and confusing potential dissenters. Together, these information-control mechanisms—suppression of dissent and confusion—render consumers
helpless under the guise of facilitating consumer responsibility.
*

*

*

I recognize that there is an inherent tension between the logical policy
conclusions of Part I—reducing prescriptive regulation and allowing communities to engage in self-determination—and the logical policy conclusions of
Part II—ramping up regulation and freeing consumers from their burdens.
This tension is resolved, in part, by resisting the instinct to take either of these
critiques to its fullest extreme. There is a role for laws that protect consumers,
particularly in the face of information asymmetries and other structural barriers to free choice. And there is a role for laws that empower consumers, particularly those participating in nondominant food cultures.
III. A POLARIZED FOOD SYSTEM
Parts I and II explored how the myths of the helpless and responsible consumer strip power from many food system participants. The myth of the helpless consumer generates the basis for homogenization, which threatens diversity
of traditions, scale, demographics, and food itself. The myth of the responsible
consumer creates a reliance on information as the basis for both individual
choice and advocacy. Consumers are then susceptible to a constructed helplessness as information supplies are shut off, diluted, or drowned out. An additional
mechanism through which food law strips power emerges from the juxtaposition of these myths: polarization. Polarization occurs along two axes: between
food producers (including food system workers) and food consumers, and
among food consumers. Polarization, in turn, exacerbates powerlessness by inhibiting the kind of cooperative advocacy necessary to resist corporate power.

201. As Hannah Arendt observed, “totalitarian movements struggling for power can use
terror to a limited extent only.” ARENDT, supra note 15, at 341. Terror must be accompanied by
propaganda and other forms of information manipulation that can facilitate indoctrination. Id.
202. Id. at 341–51; STANLEY, supra note 13, at 35 (explaining that fascist regimes use propaganda to “elevate[] the irrational over the rational, fanatical emotion over the intellect”); id. at
36 ( “Fascist politics seeks to undermine public discourse by attacking and devaluing education,
expertise, and language.”); id. at 57 (arguing that when fascist propaganda succeeds, “reality itself
is cast into doubt”).
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A. Axes of Polarization
1.

Food System Workers Versus Consumers

As described in Part I, the myth of the helpless consumer helps to support
a unidirectional chain of obligation in which producers owe a variety of duties
to consumers. At the same time, the myth of the responsible consumer helps
to support an environment in which consumers come to producers with a
range of demands. These two features set up consumers and producers as oppositional. 203 This polarization allows for exploitation of food workers and
preserves the economic power of the food industry.
While consumers benefit from numerous legal protections, producers,
and often more importantly their employees, enjoy very few. As a result of the
suite of helpless consumer laws, food businesses invest significant time and
resources into catering to consumer expectations and ensuring consumer protection. Following a “customer is always right” mentality, these laws reflect a
belief that the interests of the consumer overshadow all other interests at stake
in the food system, including those of employees, animals, and the environment. This dynamic is at its most extreme in the tipped-wages segments of the
industry, where customer satisfaction literally determines employee pay
scales. 204 The ongoing experience of workers during the COVID-19 pandemic
also illustrates this phenomenon vividly and heartbreakingly. Food system
workers deemed “essential” were expected to risk their own lives to ensure
that consumer food experiences remained uninterrupted. 205
Legal structures mirror this dynamic. Labor law is rife with food-related
exceptions. Agricultural workers, who historically were not entitled to a federal minimum wage, remain exempt from the right to engage in collective bargaining. 206 In part as a result, agricultural workers are underprotected from a
203. See Margot J. Pollans, Farming and Eating, 13 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 99 (2017) (describing the “us versus them” rhetoric that characterizes both the consumer food movement and the
defenses of conventional food production).
204. See Lee, supra note 5, at 1273–76, 1290.
205. This example may perhaps also highlight the lack of a clear outer bound of consumer
willingness to sacrifice food system workers when their interests are not aligned. Despite significant public outcry in response to dangerous conditions in many workplaces, perhaps most particularly in meat-processing plants, meat consumption hardly changed. See, e.g., Sophie Attwood
& Cother Hajat, How Will the COVID-19 Pandemic Shape the Future of Meat Consumption?, 23
PUB. HEALTH NUTRITION 3116, 3117 (2020).
206. Guadalupe T. Luna, An Infinite Distance? Agricultural Exceptionalism and Agricultural Labor, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 489–92 (1998) (describing labor law exceptions for
agricultural workers); REBECCA E. BERKEY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND FARM LABOR 65
(2017) (describing exclusion of field laborers, as distinguished from food-processing laborers,
from the Wagner Act of 1935, which established protections for worker organization); see also
Sarah O. Rodman et al., Agricultural Exceptionalism at the State Level: Characterization of Wage
and Hour Laws for U.S. Farmworkers, J. AGRIC. FOOD SYS. & CMTY. DEV., Winter 2015–2016, at
89, 99 (noting that as of 2015 no state overtime laws applied to agricultural workers and that
only eleven states guaranteed farmworkers a minimum wage). Since 2016, California (2016),
New York (2019), and Washington (2021) have extended overtime pay to farmworkers. Act. of
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variety of workplace risks, including extreme exposure to pesticides. 207 Evidence of agricultural workers’ exploitation, including occupational injury,
lack of access to health care, pesticide-related illnesses, poor housing conditions, food insecurity, debt-to-labor contractors, sexual violence, and poverty
wages, is overwhelming. 208 The myth of the responsible consumer and its attendant “vote with your fork” advocacy, which calls for consumer benevolence
toward workers, has, unsurprisingly, done little to improve workplace protections, as consumers tend to focus on spending to protect their own interests
first. 209 Likewise, homogenized food systems exacerbate workplace risks by
prioritizing consumer protection and efficiency. For instance, in regulating
line speed in hog processing facilities, the USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service focuses primarily on whether increased speeds, which processors are
clamoring for, will jeopardize food safety. 210 Faster line speeds also generate
significant risk of workplace injury, but the agency has historically viewed its
authority to take worker safety into account narrowly, and it has sometimes
declined to consider it altogether. 211
Sept. 12, 2016, ch. 313, § 2, 2016 Cal. Laws 2789, 2790–91 (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 857–
864 (West 2020)); Farm Laborers Fair Labor Practices Act, ch. 105, § 6, 2019 N.Y. Laws 848, 849
(codified as amended at N.Y. LAB. LAW § 163-a (McKinney Supp. 2021)); Act of May 11, 2021,
ch. 249, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 49.46.130(6)–(9) (2021));
see also Martinez-Cuevas v. DeRuyter Bros. Dairy, Inc., 475 P.3d 164 (Wash. 2020) (holding that
the exemption of dairy workers from state overtime laws violated the state constitution).
207. See BERKEY, supra note 206, at 39–42 (surveying studies of prevalence of pesticiderelated illness among farmworkers).
208. See id. at 38–50.
209. See Lee, supra note 5, at 1273–76 (explaining why this type of advocacy has limited
value in the context of worker protection); see also supra Section II.A.3 (describing the trend of
placing responsibility for workers onto consumers).
210. Line speed refers to the number of animals a facility can process per minute, and faster
speeds increase risk of repetitive-stress injury. USDA Increases Line Speeds, Endangering Poultry
Processing Plant Workers, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.ucsusa
.org/resources/attacks-on-science/usda-increases-line-speeds-endangering-poultry-processing-plant
[perma.cc/ZFN8-WVDU].
211. United Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 663 v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 532 F. Supp. 3d
741 (D. Minn. 2021) (finding USDA’s failure to consider worker safety when repealing linespeed regulations at pork-processing plants arbitrary and capricious). Although the Biden administration announced that it would not appeal the decision, Secretary of Agriculture Tom
Vilsack testified to the House Agriculture Committee in October 2021 that the USDA intended
to revisit the issue and find ways for pork processors to speed up operations again. Tom Polansek, U.S. Mulls Waivers for Pork Plants Forced to Slow Down, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-pork-slaughtering/u-s-mulls-waivers-for-pork-plantsforced-to-slow-down-vilsack-idUSKBN2GX2CV [perma.cc/LDG7-ZADQ]. The agency has a
process for allow waivers from existing line speeds for poultry and pork facilities that lists employee safety as just one of twelve criteria for approval. Salmonella Initiative Program Criteria,
USDA FOOD SAFETY & INSPECTION SERV. (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/sciencedata/data-sets-visualizations/microbiology/microbiological-testing-program-rte-meat-and
[perma.cc/HY3F-NS87]. A recent USDA Office of Inspector General report noted that regulators approving waivers typically did not maintain sufficient documentation with regard to this
criterion, such that it was difficult to assess whether reviewers adequately enforced the criterion.
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AUDIT REP. NO. 24601-0007-31, FSIS WAIVER
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The juxtaposition of the helpless consumer, in need of protection from
their food, with food system workers, who are not protected as they make that
food, establishes a troubling asymmetry. It is also illogical. There is considerable overlap between producers and consumers. Essentially all Americans are
food consumers, and about one-sixth of the workforce works in the food system. 212 Food system workers are protected as consumers but ignored as workers. Put another way, lettuce is deemed to pose a risk to a person who might
get sick from eating it if it is contaminated with e. Coli. It is not deemed a risk
to the same person who might get sunstroke from harvesting it during a heat
wave. The helpless consumer is thus dangerous not because the consumer is
relieved of responsibility for the farmworker but because the system is structured to protect consumers at the expense of all others, regardless of need.
A parallel set of tensions exist between food consumers and farmers. Although some farmers receive significant federal financial support, many do
not. For instance, recent subsidies distributed to respond to former president
Trump’s trade war with China were given almost entirely to white farmers. 213
And some categories of farmers are particularly vulnerable within the food
system’s structure. For example, the vast majority of broiler chickens are
raised under contract with poultry processors. 214 In theory, contracts are beneficial because they allow farmers to share yield and price risk with their buyers, who commit to prices up front and often purchase the final products in
advance of production. In practice, however, the structure of contract markets
leaves poultry farmers open to exploitation. 215 During a series of Department

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 6 (2021), https://www.usda.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/24601-0007-31_final_distribution.pdf [perma.cc/ZS84-NZBF].
212. This includes jobs in food production, processing, distribution, service, and retail.
FOOD CHAIN WORKERS ALL., THE HANDS THAT FEED US: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR WORKERS ALONG THE FOOD CHAIN 11–12 (2012), https://foodchainworkers.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Hands-That-Feed-Us-Report.pdf [perma.cc/XB5J-EMWG] (relying on
2010 data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 2007 Census of Agriculture, and 2009 U.S.
Census figures).
213. Nathan Rosenberg & Bryce Wilson Stucki, USDA Gave Almost 100 Percent of Trump’s
Trade War Bailout to White Farmers, COUNTER (July 29, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://newfoodeconomy.org/usda-trump-trade-war-bailout-white-farmers-race [perma.cc/C93T-NCSX] (citing research that the bailout disproportionately benefited white and wealthy landowners); HOSSEIN
AYAZI & ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, HAAS INST., THE US FARM BILL: CORPORATE POWER AND
STRUCTURAL RACIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES FOOD SYSTEM 50–60 (2015), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haasinstitutefarmbillreport_publish_0.pdf [perma.cc
/2X9X-F3D8].
214. See James MacDonald, Trends in Agricultural Contracts, 30 CHOICES, no. 3, 2015, at 2,
https://www.choicesmagazine.org/UserFiles/file/cmsarticle_461.pdf [perma.cc/QFB9-BUNA].
215. There are two types of contracts. Marketing contracts specify price or a pricing mechanism and an outlet for sale, insulating the farmer from price fluctuation. JAMES MACDONALD
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AER-837, CONTRACTS, MARKETS, AND PRICES: ORGANIZING THE
PRODUCTION AND USE OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES 4 (2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov
/webdocs/publications/41702/14700_aer837_1_.pdf?v=0 [perma.cc/63GZ-8HAT]. Marketing
contracts may also specify product quality. Christopher R. Kelley, Agricultural Production Contracts: Drafting Considerations, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 397, 401 (1995). By contrast, production
OF
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of Justice listening sessions, many participants charged that “producers who
raise or sell animals under contract are subjected to unfair or abusive treatment.” 216 In 2008, Congress directed USDA to address this issue, but subsequent congresses and the Trump administration have stymied meaningful
change. 217
Although farmers remain a potent symbolic force in politics, their economic and political power is declining. 218 Farmers have less market power and
face significant barriers to changing their practices, including the cost of
adopting new production methods or shifting crops and lack of access to markets for different crops. 219 At the same time, they are subject to widespread
critique from environmental and consumer groups. 220 A recent article captured the perceived divide between farmers and consumers: “[C]onsumers
ha[ve] a hard-to-satisfy wish list for those who put food on our tables—with
most claiming to feel knowledgeable about how our food is raised.” 221 The

contracts are much more detailed, often “giv[ing] the [buyer] direct control of farm production
methods.” Id. at 401. They may specify inputs (seed stock, fertilizer, pesticides), direct production
methods, and allow the contracting buyer to make field visits. MACDONALD ET AL., supra, at 4.
216. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., COMPETITION IN AGRICULTURE: VOICES FROM THE WORKSHOPS
ON AGRICULTURE AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN OUR 21ST CENTURY ECONOMY AND
THOUGHTS ON THE WAY FORWARD 20–21 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr
/legacy/2012/05/16/283291.pdf [perma.cc/7KZ9-M9YB].
217. The USDA first promulgated new regulations in 2011 but was prevented from enforcing them by a series of appropriations riders. JOEL L. GREENE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41673,
USDA’S “GIPSA RULE” ON LIVESTOCK AND POULTRY MARKETING PRACTICES (2016) (describing the statutory and regulatory history from 2008 to 2016). In 2016, the USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) promulgated rules to protect farmers
from unfair practices, only to withdraw them a year later. Scope of Sections 202(a) and (b) of the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,566 (Dec. 20, 2016) (allowing individual farmers to
establish unfair practices without proving harm to the entire market); Unfair Practices and Undue Preferences in Violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 92,703 (proposed
Dec. 20, 2016) (defining what kinds of contracting practices would violate the Act); 82 Fed. Reg.
48,584 (Oct. 18, 2017) (withdrawing the interim final rule); 82 Fed. Reg. 48,603 (Oct. 18, 2017)
(announcing no further action on the proposed rule). The Trump administration disbanded
GIPSA as part of a USDA reorganization. Revisions of Delegations of Authority, 83 Fed. Reg.
61,309, 61,310 (Nov. 29, 2018). The Biden administration has announced plans to revive some
aspects of the Obama-era rules. Exec. Order No. 14,036, § 5(i), 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987, 36,992–94
(July 9, 2021) (directing USDA to revisit these rules); Poultry Grower Ranking Systems: Withdrawal, 86 Fed. Reg. 60,779 (Nov. 4, 2021) (withdrawing a stalled Obama-era proposed rule and
announcing plans to commence a new rulemaking).
218. See Ben-Asher & Pollans, supra note 82, at 28–29 (describing the symbolic power of
the family farm in American politics); Pollans, supra note 203, at 107–08 (describing the declining market power of farmers).
219. Pollans, supra note 203, at 106–07.
220. Id. at 101–02 (describing the antifarmer rhetoric of the environmental and consumer
food movements).
221. Survey: Consumer Expectations Make It Tough to Be a Farmer, AGDAILY (Aug. 6,
2019), https://www.agdaily.com/insights/consumer-expectations-take-toll-farmers [perma.cc
/7V4Q-TG3N] (characterizing data from a new study by Cargill); see also Pollans, supra note
203, at 103 (quoting a Trump-Pence campaign talking point promising to “defend American

684

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:643

framework of the responsible consumer underlies this illusion of oppositional
interests between farmers and consumers. To put it crudely, the responsible
consumer is invited to have preferences about farming practices, a fraught endeavor for even the most informed consumer and one that seems almost certain to alienate farmers, who do not want to be told how to do their jobs by
people lacking practical farming knowledge.
The myth of consumer responsibility suggests that government intervention in food production is unnecessary because consumers are empowered not
to need it. At the same time, a corollary narrative is that intervention would in
fact be detrimental to consumers because it would make food more expensive.
Producers must be free to produce as much food as cheaply as possible. If
farmers can protect consumers, then farmers are free to do what is necessary to
achieve this goal, and consumers are otherwise on their own. This view of the
food system relies on the theory of productivism, which assumes that increasing
agricultural productivity is the key to reducing hunger. 222 Although the USDA
defines food security more broadly as “access by all people at all times to
enough food for an active, healthy life” and “one of several conditions necessary for a population to be healthy and well-nourished,” 223 productivism remains a central focus of the food security framework. 224 Faced with projections
of population growth, global policymakers speak of the need to double levels
of food production. 225 In the United States, policymakers and agricultural-industry advocates regularly focus on farmers’ role in “feeding the world.” 226
In part because of this rhetoric, those working in the food system remain
in poverty and are often food insecure themselves. 227 This connection remains
Agriculture against its critics, particularly those who have never grown or produced anything
beyond a backyard tomato plant”).
222. See NORA MCKEON, FOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE: EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES,
REGULATING CORPORATIONS 71–73 (2015) (observing that typical measures of productivity,
such as yield, often miss more context-specific measures, such as productivity per unit of labor,
that might be more useful); Olivier De Schutter, The Specter of Productivism and Food Democracy, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 199, 199–200.
223. ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN, MATTHEW P. RABBITT, CHRISTIAN A. GREGORY & ANITA
SINGH, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ERR-270, HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES IN
2018, at 2 (2019), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/94849/err-270.pdf?v=340.9
[perma.cc/6ZRC-D37S].
224. See John Ingram, A Food Systems Approach to Researching Food Security and Its Interactions with Global Environmental Change, 3 FOOD SEC. 417, 418–19 (2011) (concluding that
research into increased productivity vastly outstrips research into other aspects of food security).
225. See, e.g., L. VAL GIDDINGS, MATTHEW STEPP & MARK CAINE, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., FEEDING THE PLANET IN A WARMING WORLD: BUILDING RESILIENT
AGRICULTURE THROUGH INNOVATION 7–8 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-feeding-planetwarming-world.pdf [perma.cc/FD6X-S44H].
226. See, e.g., AGDAILY, supra note 221 (using this rhetoric); Margaret Mellon, Let’s Drop
“Feed the World”: A Plea to Move Beyond an Unhelpful Phrase, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS:
THE EQUATION (Aug. 30, 2013, 9:19 AM), https://blog.ucsusa.org/margaret-mellon/lets-dropfeed-the-world-a-plea-to-move-beyond-an-unhelpful-phrase-229 [perma.cc/C2Z2-QZH8].
227. Sandy Brown & Christy Getz, Farmworker Food Insecurity and the Production of Hunger in California, in CULTIVATING FOOD JUSTICE: RACE, CLASS, AND SUSTAINABILITY 121, 121
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invisible because “the concept of food security, as deployed by domestic actors, has largely sidestepped a structural analysis of hunger. The result has
been a focus on feeding hungry people, rather than altering the production
relations and modes of governance that underpin food insecurity.” 228 Agricultural workers are particularly susceptible to food insecurity, and susceptibility
is higher for workers without legal status in the United States as these workers
do not have access to Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP)
benefits. 229 Over the years, agricultural workers “have been recruited and expelled to meet growers’ shifting needs for labor in the fields.” 230 Consumerresponsibility narratives on food security, and in particular on work requirements for access to social safety nets, reinforce this pattern. Low-income people are compelled to accept low-wage work to remain eligible for benefits. 231
2.

Consumer Versus Consumer

The myth of the responsible consumer also generates a second axis of polarization. As personal health, household food security, and equity and sustainability are tied to individual choice, individual capacity to and interest in
making those choices becomes a source of division. While some consumers
have the time, money, and inclination to invest significantly into researching
their food choices, others do not. Just as consumers are asked to do more and
more with their food dollars, social-welfare support to supplement those dollars is declining. 232
Consumer responsibility for equity and sustainability results in dichotomous rhetoric. On the one hand is the “if they only knew” rhetoric, which
laments lack of education and argues that consumers would make different
choices if they knew better where their food came from. 233 Michael Pollan exemplifies this philosophy:

(Alison Hope Alkon & Julian Agyeman eds., 2011) (observing that “those who produce our nation’s food are among the most likely to be hungry or food insecure”).
228. Id. at 122.
229. Id. at 132 (reviewing findings from a study of agricultural workers in Fresno County,
California).
230. Id. at 134–35 (describing the historical construction of “ideologies of racial difference”
to justify exploitation and foment backlash against labor militancy).
231. See supra notes 148–149 and accompanying text (describing public benefit infrastructure); AYAZI & ELSHEIKH, supra note 213, at 41–42 (arguing that SNAP provides a significant
subsidy to businesses who can get away with paying low wages because their employees can supplement their earnings with SNAP benefits).
232. See supra Section II.A (describing growing expectations on consumers on all these
fronts); Andrea Freeman, Transparency for Food Consumers: Nutrition Labeling and Food Oppression, 41 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 316 (2015) (arguing that it is cost and availability that prevents
low-income consumers from buying healthy food, not lack of information).
233. Julie Guthman, “If They Only Knew”: The Unbearable Whiteness of Alternative Food,
in CULTIVATING FOOD JUSTICE: RACE, CLASS, AND SUSTAINABILITY, supra note 227, at 263;
DUPUIS, supra note 101, at 102 (explaining that “the notion of unveiling is itself romantic, a
promise that the ‘real’ good food can be found underneath the veil”).
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If people could peer over the increasingly high walls of our industrial
agriculture they would surely change the way they eat.
Increasing numbers of Americans aren’t waiting: they’re changing now.
This desire for something better—something safer, something more sustainable, something more humane and something tastier—is what’s bringing
people to the Whole Foods and the farmer’s market . . . . 234

Some advocates espouse an even more insidious version, arguing that if
people could only taste real food, they would make better choices. 235 Scholars
have long critiqued this aspect of the movement as neoliberal, pointing out
that it relieves the public sector of responsibility for serious public problems,
puts the burdens of those problems on individuals, and allows the food industry to continue with business as usual. 236
The trend places responsibility on individual consumers without considering structural barriers that hinder choice. The first of these barriers is cost.
From a food producer’s perspective, the primary function of a certification is
to charge a price premium. Healthier, more sustainable, and more humane
food choices are often more expensive. 237 Second, the moral choice is not always straightforward. How, for instance, should a consumer balance label information about animal welfare with information about carbon footprint? 238
Labels themselves also face numerous methodology and legitimacy problems
and may not be reliable sources of information. 239
In part because of these barriers, the myth of the responsible consumer is
susceptible to the charge of elitism—the other side of the dichotomous rhetoric. Critical food scholar Julie Guthman refers to Michael Pollan’s approach
as “privileged,” 240 and more pointed critiques fill the pages of conservative and
libertarian media. 241 Critics have also observed that the consumer food movement tends to create and reproduce “white spaces” that are exclusive both for

234. Pollan, supra note 156.
235. See, e.g., DAN BARBER, THE THIRD PLATE: FIELD NOTES ON THE FUTURE OF FOOD 11,
22 (2014) (describing how chefs have “the potential to get people to rethink their eating habits”
and arguing that taste “can be a guide in reimagining our food system, and our diets, from the
ground up”).
236. See, e.g., Guthman, supra note 233; Julie Guthman, Can’t Stomach It: How Michael
Pollan et al. Made Me Want to Eat Cheetos, GASTRONOMICA, Summer 2007, at 75; Alkon &
Guthman, supra note 1, at 10–15 (arguing that “[w]hen food activists argue that the best way to
create a sustainable food system is to become a producer or consumer of local and organic food,
they are working within [a] neoliberal worldview” that focuses on “the primacy of the so-called
free market, unconstrained by government intervention”).
237. See Pollans, supra note 203, at 109 & n.48.
238. See Czarnezki et al., supra note 161, at 1016 (describing the problem of cross-product
comparison and the inadequacy of labels for guiding consumers’ choices).
239. Id. at 1008–16.
240. Guthman, supra note 233, at 78 (calling his approach both “privileged” and troublingly “apolitical”).
241. See, e.g., Matthew Continetti, Freedom Is Eating Steak Well Done with Ketchup, NAT’L
REV. (Mar. 18, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/donald-trump-steak-
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the structural reasons described above and for cultural reasons. 242 Here, processes of food homogenization reinforce this culture war by stigmatizing nondominant foodways. As discussed in Part I, homogenization others outsider
foods and food production practices. 243 In conjunction with responsibilization, it also sets the stage for the charge that consumers who do try to take
action and demand change from food producers are themselves deviant and
should be dismissed.
This fight over who gets to decide what good food is—and even the basic
assumption that there is such a thing as “good food”—fosters mutual judgment and magnifies ideological divides. As I have argued elsewhere, the big
beneficiary of this ideological divide is the food industry. 244 Food law—including consumer protection laws that create one-way obligations from producers
to consumers and information-control regimes that undermine food consumers’ capacity to understand the system they participate in—plays a critical role
in fostering this polarization.
B. Polarization as a Disempowerment Tool
Polarization magnifies the collective-action problem already facing those
advocating for systemic change. Hannah Arendt argues that “[s]ocial atomization and extreme individualization preced[e] the mass movements” that allow for the rise of authoritarian regimes. 245 This is achieved through isolation
of those with common interests. Focusing in particular on the breakdown of
social classes, she observes that without these common bonds to overcome
difference, “the whole fabric of visible and invisible threads which bound the
people to the body politic” disintegrates. 246 Ultranationalism feeds on “us ver-

liberals-show-their-elitism-while-mocking-trump [perma.cc/SFT4-72YC]; Katherine Timpf,
Study: Michelle Obama’s Nutrition Advice Is Sexist and ‘Elitist,’ NAT’L REV. (Sept. 16, 2014, 7:30
PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2014/09/study-michelle-obamas-nutrition-advice-sexist-and-elitist-katherine-timpf [perma.cc/DAL9-DRTQ]; Suzanne Zuppello, Slow Food’s Elitism
Only Fueled My Craving for McDonald’s: Carlo Petrini’s Cult-Like Food Movement Is One for the
Privileged, EATER (Oct. 18, 2018, 10:17 AM), https://www.eater.com/2018/10/18/17943358
/slow-food-manifesto-elitist-fast-food [perma.cc/78MB-Y5ZR].
242. See, e.g., Margot Pollans & Michael Roberts, Setting the Table for Urban Agriculture,
46 URB. LAW. 199, 218–20 (2014) (summarizing literature that identifies how urban agriculture
projects and farmers’ markets can become “white spaces”); Kristen Aiken, ‘White People Food’
Is Creating an Unattainable Picture of Health, HUFFPOST (Mar. 9, 2021), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/white-people-food_n_5b75c270e4b0df9b093dadbb [perma.cc/4VCB-VW3H].
243. See supra Section I.B.
244. See Pollans, supra note 203, at 112.
245. ARENDT, supra note 15, at 316–17.
246. Id. at 314; see STANLEY, supra note 13, at 172; Theodor W. Adorno, Freudian Theory
and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda (1951), reprinted in THE CULTURE INDUSTRY 131 (J.M.
Bernstein ed., 1991) (observing that the central structure of fascism lies in erasing differences
within an in-group and emphasizing differences with outsiders to prevent any “realization of
true equality”); see also PAXTON, supra note 131, at 10 (describing how fascist regimes often
began with anticapitalist rhetoric but, once in power, “banned strikes, dissolved independent
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sus them” rhetoric to mobilize solidarity oriented around the state, encouraging a strong relationship between each individual and the state and discouraging other kinds of solidarity relationships. 247 Indeed, fascist regimes
frequently targeted labor unions, which those regimes deemed threats because
they created “mutual bonds along lines of class.” 248
As the previous Sections established, this same polarizing dynamic plays
out in the food system. Food law generates and reinforces us-versus-them sentiments along several axes, isolating those who may otherwise have common
interests. This fragmentation preserves the economic power of the food industry and exacerbates exploitation of food system workers and food consumers, particular minority and low-income consumers.
C. From Fascism to Sovereignty
This Article argues that food law facilitates the loss of individual and community sovereignty, and it frames this loss of sovereignty as a matter of powerlessness. Homogenization creates powerlessness by eliminating meaningful
choice. This powerlessness is felt most acutely by those whose traditional
foodways fall outside the prescribed norms of the U.S. food system. Information control creates powerlessness by disempowering those who might
otherwise express their political and social preferences through food choice
just as consumers are distracted from more direct means of food-related political participation. Finally, polarization creates powerlessness by curtailing
solidarity between the different segments of the population exploited by the
food industry.
Where law produces powerlessness, it advances something more insidious: fascism. Hannah Arendt puts the loss of individual and community sovereignty at the core of fascism, and the constructed powerlessness that this
Article describes is perhaps a democracy-friendly euphemism for fascism. 249
It might be that fascism is a useful analytical tool to assess the U.S. food system. 250 Even in the absence of authoritarian power, the dominant food system,
labor unions, lowered wage earners’ purchasing power, and showered money on armaments industries”). Class bonds are particularly threatening to fascist regimes because “[f]ascist politics
is most effective under conditions of stark economic inequality.” STANLEY, supra note 13, at 172.
In the United States, just as in Germany and elsewhere, “racial division has always countered the
unifying force of the labor movement.” Id. at 173. Fascism thus relies on a magnification of some
differences—often, though not always, of race—and a playing down of others—often of class or
otherwise economic in nature.
247. See ARENDT, supra note 15, at 323–24.
248. STANLEY, supra note 13, at 172.
249. See ARENDT, supra note 15, at 433 (explaining that the meaning of freedom is also
undermined by the arbitrariness of the exercise of totalitarian power).
250. “Fascism” is an imprecise term. See Gilbert Allardyce, What Fascism Is Not: Thoughts
on the Deflation of a Concept, 84 AM. HIST. REV. F. 367, 367 (1979) (lamenting that “we have
agreed to use the word without agreeing on how to define it”). As historian Kevin Passmore has
observed, “the final meaning of a political label is ungraspable”; its meaning derives only from
specific contexts in which the label is used. KEVIN PASSMORE, FASCISM: A VERY SHORT
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as characterized by homogenization, information control, and polarization,
has taken on the key hallmarks of fascist ordering. 251
Food has a deep relationship to state power. At one extreme, it plays a
significant role in fascist and other authoritarian regimes. From forced starvation (for example, in Nazi concentration camps 252) to centralized food system planning (for example, in Italy under Mussolini 253), controlling food is a
key path to controlling people. Historian Tiago Saraiva puts food at the center
of fascism’s rise, arguing that “every fascist regime of the interwar period became obsessed with projects for making the national soil feed the national
body.” 254 At the other extreme, food plays a key role in anarchist communities.
Articulating a theory of “escape agriculture,” anarchist historian James Scott
describes how communities around the world intentionally adopted certain
foods and agricultural practices, such as shifting agriculture and tuber crops,
that evade state appropriation because they are difficult to locate and tax. 255
These food choices and food production practices allowed communities to resist the control of oppressive governmental regimes and remain essentially
stateless. 256
If this Article provides a conceptual critique of U.S. food law, it also offers
a roadmap for reform, identifying the laws, policies, and institutional actors
that strip power from the majority of food system participants. The primary
INTRODUCTION 20 (2d ed. 2014); see also RENZO DE FELICE, INTERPRETATIONS OF FASCISM
(Brenda Huff Everett trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1977) (1969) (concluding that each fascist regime is unique and that no general interpretation is possible). In this sense, Passmore concludes
“[t]he only thing that really distinguishes fascism from other concepts is its enormous negative
moral charge.” PASSMORE, supra, at 20. Likewise, Madeleine Albright observes the recent trend
to overuse the term in all arenas of our lives and concludes that using the label for anything we
do not like can reduce the potency of an otherwise powerful term. MADELEINE ALBRIGHT,
FASCISM: A WARNING 8 (2018).
251. The term “food fascism” has also been used in modern parlance to describe governmental policies, such as California’s foie gras ban or New York City’s soda portion control policy,
that restrict access to certain foods. See supra note 17. But these kinds of critiques overemphasize
individual free choice, losing track of how much that choice is constrained in neoliberal economic systems and ignoring the importance of community self-determination.
252. ADAM TOOZE, THE WAGES OF DESTRUCTION: THE MAKING AND BREAKING OF THE
NAZI ECONOMY 529–44 (2006) (describing food policies in concentration camps and in prisoner-of-war labor camps).
253. Carol F. Helstosky, Fascist Food Politics: Mussolini’s Policy of Alimentary Sovereignty,
9 J. MOD. ITALIAN STUD. 1, 1 (2004).
254. SARAIVA, supra note 14, at 7. Perhaps the overtly fascist regimes of the twentieth century focused so intently on food because they emerged during an era of widespread poverty and
hunger. Even so, food provides an essential axis for control because of its universal centrality.
255. JAMES C. SCOTT, THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY OF
UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA 187–207 (2009) (rejecting the “civilizational narrative” of progress
from foraging through pastoral nomadism, shifting cultivation, sedentary fixed-field agriculture,
and irrigated agriculture to industrial agriculture and observing that oscillation between foraging, shifting agriculture, and settled agriculture was “a strategic option to circumvent the many
inconveniences of state power”).
256. Id. (identifying forced labor, crop confiscation, taxation, forced relocation, and epidemics, among others, as state practices communities sought to evade).
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goal of reform should be to establish food sovereignty, the functional inverse
of food fascism. 257 Sovereignty, as distinct from food freedom (and other
forms of food libertarianism) relies not on an individual’s absolute right to
choose what and how to eat but on the power of individuals, communities,
and nations to participate in the critical decisions that shape the food system.
Building sovereignty begins with dismantling the fascist structures of food
law. In some cases, the dismantling is simple, requiring only the repeal of a
problematic policy (for instance, SNAP work requirements or food disparagement laws). In other cases, the dismantling requires more complex tradeoffs
between the goal of sovereignty and the need for risk management (for instance, food safety or food fraud law reform). 258 Ultimately, dismantling food
fascism is necessary to make the apparent goal of the food system—to allow
eating that is physically, culturally, and emotionally sustainable—an achievable reality.
CONCLUSION
I end with a word of caution. Fascist regimes depend on myth. 259 Therefore, dismantling the two myths at the core of the U.S. food-law system—the
myths of the helpless and responsible consumer—is a necessary yet fraught first
step. Unwinding the myth of the helpless consumer requires embracing lay
expertise in food safety, but it also requires empowering communities to assess
safety. Doing so without simultaneously dismantling the myth of the responsible consumer risks doubling down on the latter myth’s oppressions. Likewise, dismantling the myth of the responsible consumer, which would involve
alleviating burdens on consumers to eat the “right food,” risks doubling down
on the helpless consumer myth. Instead, the two myths must be understood
and unwound together through investment in food system governance that
can reflect our diverse social, religious, physical, and emotional food needs.

257. See supra note 12 for a definition of food sovereignty.
258. For discussion of potential approaches to food safety law reform, see generally Broad
Leib & Pollans, supra note 18.
259. On the centrality of myth to fascist nation-making, see generally PHILIPPE LACOUELABARTHE, HEIDEGGER AND THE POLITICS OF POETRY (Jeff Fort trans., Univ. of Ill. Press 2007)
(2002).

